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The Measure of the Doubt:
Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation
at the Federal Circuit
JEFFREY A. LEFSTIN*
On appeal to the Court of Errors, the court was equally divided.
Spencer, Senator, wrote that the indictment was bad, and Stebbins,
Senator, that it was good. The President gave a casting vote with the
result that the indictment fell. The closeness of the division attests the
measure of the doubt.... It is one of the battlefields of the law.
- Cardozo'
INTRODUCTION
The law of patent claim interpretation, we are told, is a mess. A
patent's claims define with words the limits of the inventor's exclusive
rights, just as physical boundaries may define the limits of real property
rights. Perhaps no subject is as central to patent law. To determine
whether a patent has been infringed, or to determine whether the patent
ought to have been granted in the first place, a court must first define the
boundaries of the patent by interpreting its claims. With claim
construction being the linchpin of so many disputes in patent law, we
would expect the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
whose exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters was granted to
promote consistency and predictability in patent law, to have articulated
a framework that resolves these central interpretation questions with a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Christian
Chu, of Fish & Richardson, P.C., collected the data shown in Table I and part of the data shown in
Table IX and provided many helpful suggestions on data collection. The author thanks Robert Kohn,
San Francisco Department of Public Health, and Carol Mathews, University of California, San
Francisco, for guidance on statistics; Margreth Barrett, David Faigman, Robin Feldman, Evan Lee,
and Lois Weithorn for useful comments and suggestions; and Charlie Chou, Diana Kruze, Michael
Allen, and Genevieve Guertin for excellent research assistance.
i. State ex rel. Hayes v. McLaughlin, i6o N.E. 357, 358 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.). The question
before the court, which had divided the New York Supreme Court a century prior in Lambert v.
People, was whether an indictment for conspiracy need set forth the unlawful means employed by the
alleged conspirators. 9 Cow. 578, 586 (N.Y. 1827).
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high degree of predictability. Yet, according to many observers,
instability and unpredictability in the law of claim interpretation have
reached a point of crisis.
Dire warnings that the appellate courts have left off all stability,
predictability, and certainty are not unique to patent law, nor to this era.3
But whether it be the substantive principles of claim interpretation; the
procedures (or lack thereof) prescribed by the Federal Circuit for the
district courts to perform claim interpretation; or the manner in which
the Federal Circuit reviews the claim interpretations of the district
courts; commentators, practitioners, trial judges, and even some judges
of the Federal Circuit themselves seem united in their view that
uncertainty and unpredictability are the order of the day.4 This
dissatisfaction is more than just the anecdotal grumblings of disappointed
litigants. Empirical studies of patent litigation have shown that a large
proportion of district court claim constructions are upset by the Federal
Circuit on appeal,5 and have identified conflicts in the methodology of
2. See, e.g., Joseph S. Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177. (2005). As Miller writes:
Claim construction jurisprudence is in disarray. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reverses trial court claim construction decisions at a worryingly high rate.
The proportion of Federal Circuit claim construction opinions that include separate
concurrences or dissents continues to grow. And the muddled mix of issues the Federal
Circuit framed for en banc review in the Phillips case suggests that the court cannot reach
consensus on what the central questions are, much less on how to answer them. Perhaps the
path to adequately predictable claim construction is continued tinkering with the analytical
constructs internal to the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence, but that is not
likely.
Id.
3. Llewellyn in 196o began The Common Law Tradition with that era's lamentation about
unpredictability: "This book starts with the fact that the bar is bothered about our appellate courts-
not the much discussed Supreme Court alone, but our appellate courts in general. The bar is so much
bothered about these courts that we face a crisis in confidence which packs danger." Though Llewellyn
recognized that "roughly since before Genesis, each new crucial decision has been, for some vocal
citizens, the brink of perdition," he thought the angst of his time to strike at the core of the profession:
[Ilt has come to lay a pall and palsy on heart and hand because it goes to whether there is
any reckonability in the work of our appellate courts, any real stability of footing for the
lawyer, be it appellate litigation or in counseling, whether therefore there is any effective
craftsmanship for him to bring to bear to serve his client and justify his being.
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 1-2 (5960).
4. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231-33 (2005) ("There is concern among the bench and
bar that the Federal Circuit's de novo review of district court claim construction decisions and lack of
guidance have caused considerable unpredictability.... [C]riticism over the lack of guidance and
unpredictability caused by the current claim construction process is warranted. The problem is getting
worse, not better."); id. at 231 n.2 (collecting criticisms from judges, scholars, practitioners).
5. See Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH. I, 8-IO (2OOI); see also Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1504 (2ooi); Andrew T. Zidel,
Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the
Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 736-55 (2003).
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claim construction among the appellate judges themselves.6 Concerns
over the rate at which the Federal Circuit reverses district court claim
constructions have also prompted legislation that would assign patent
infringement actions to specific district courts and judges with experience
in patent cases.' The Federal Circuit itself was sufficiently moved by
worries about its claim construction jurisprudence to grant en banc
review on an unprecedented and extraordinarily wide array of claim
construction questions in Phillips v. AWH Corp. in 2004, though the
court ultimately addressed few of those questions in its en banc opinion.9
Yet, beneath the nearly' ° seamless consensus about the unhappy
state of the law, important questions have remained unasked and
unanswered. Is the existing empirical evidence really sufficient to
conclude that the law and process of claim interpretation is in urgent
need of repair? More particularly, if the resolution of claim construction
disputes is unpredictable, is this an unusual state of affairs? Or is it one
common to other aspects of patent law and to other fields of law as well?
And if participants in the system cannot predict the outcome of claim
construction disputes, is it because the principles of claim construction
are insufficiently determinate, or do such principles exist but remain
hidden from the majority of observers?
This study attempts to answer these questions. Specifically, I attempt
to measure the legal indeterminacy associated with claim construction
and other legal issues by determining the frequency with which various
legal issues and regimes provoke dissents among the judges of the
Federal Circuit. Part I of this Article briefly reviews the role of claims in
patent law and the regime currently governing resolution of claim
construction disputes. Part II considers the extant theoretical and
empirical work on judicial dissent and argues that dissent frequencies at
intermediate appellate courts may be used to measure the indeterminacy
of legal regimes. Part III erects a simple theoretical framework to model
quantitatively the relationship between legal indeterminacy and judicial
6. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1161-63 (2004).
7. See, e.g., Improving Federal Court Adjudication of Patent Cases: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Io9th
Cong. IO9-59 (Oct. 6, 2005) (statement of Kimberly A. Moore, Professor of Law, George Mason
University School of Law) (citing reversal rate in support of proposal to allocate patent cases to select
district court judges); 153 CONG. REC. H1430, 1432 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2007) (statement of Rep. Berman
in support of H.R. 34) ("The impetus behind this bill, in part, is the high reversal rate of district court
decisions. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals . . . reverses over 30 percent of the district court
patent claim constructions.").
8. 376 F.3d 1382, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
9- 415 F.3d 1303, 1308-28 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Io. There are occasional arguments that claim interpretation is not exceptional, at least not in
light of the inherent difficulties in construing language. See 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
657, 659 (Oct. 14, 2006) (testimony of Judge Ellis).
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dissent and describes the methodology used to implement the model.
Part IV compares dissent rates in appeals originating from the various
tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit to investigate the relative
indeterminacy of patent law as a whole against other bodies of law. Part
V reports the frequency of dissent on claim construction and other issues
arising in patent cases, to establish the relative indeterminacy of claim
construction against other aspects of patent law. Part VI describes the
theoretical framework necessary to compare the indeterminacy of
different legal regimes between different courts, and attempts to apply
that framework by assessing the indeterminacy of claim construction
against that of another interpretive regime, contract interpretation.
Finally, I consider what conclusions might be drawn from these
investigations of indeterminacy, and what prescriptions they imply for
improving certainty in patent litigation and counseling.
I. PATENT CLAIMS AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL
A brief exposition of the role of claims and claim interpretation will
suffice for the reader unfamiliar with patent law. A patent on an
invention grants the holder the right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, or importing the invention in the United States." Aside
from certain formalities, a patent contains only a written description
disclosing the invention to the public, and one or more "claims."'" A
patent's claims define, in words, exactly what "the invention" is. They
may be only a few words long or extend for pages, but in either case they
are the raison d'etre of the patent. When we ask whether the inventor is
entitled to a patent, or when we ask against what things and activities the
patent holder may assert the exclusive rights granted by statute,'3 the
claims control our inquiry. Whether or not the meaning of the claims is
disputed, nearly all disputes under the patent laws involve at least one of
three comparisons with the claims: a comparison of the claims against
what the alleged infringer has made or done, to determine whether the
alleged infringer has infringed the patent; a comparison of the claims
against what was previously known ("the prior art"), to determine
whether the inventor has met the novelty and non-obviousness
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103; or a comparison of the claims
II. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
12. Id. § i . Generally, the disclosure of the written description remains fixed from the point
when the inventor submits her application for a patent to the Patent and Trademark Office. In
contrast, the claims usually evolve over a course of negotiation between the applicant and the patent
examiner, in which the applicant and the examiner reach agreement over what scope of coverage the
inventor is entitled to in light of the statutory standards of patentability.
13. Id. § 271. The judicial "doctrine of equivalents" may permit the patent holder to assert
infringement against things not literally encompassed by the claims but substantially similar to the
invention defined by the claims. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 731-32 (2002).
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against the patent's written description, to determine whether the
inventor has complied with the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.
The intertwined issues of whether interpretation of patent claims is a
question of fact or law, and whether interpretation is a task for the jury
or the judge, divided the Federal Circuit for more than a decade after its
creation.'4 In 1995, the court decided Markman v. Westview Instruments
en banc, holding (over vigorous dissents) that claim construction was a
matter of law, to be decided by the judge alone, and reviewed de novo on
appeal."s The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that while the question of
infringement itself was guaranteed a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment, historical practice and interpretive competency favored
assigning the interpretative task to judges.' 6 The Court also reasoned
that, at least at the level of the individual patent, treating claim
interpretation as a question of law would promote uniformity of
interpretation given that all patent appeals were resolved by the Federal
Circuit. 7 Despite the Court's classification of claim construction as a
question of law, following Markman, some panels of the Federal Circuit
persisted in applying a clearly erroneous standard of review to district
courts' claim constructions, on the theory that claim construction
frequently required factual determinations. 8 Once again meeting en
banc, and once again over vigorous dissent, the Federal Circuit held in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies that it would review the district court's
claim constructions de novo on appeal. 9 Judges on the Federal Circuit
continue to voice their disagreement with de novo review of claim
construction, 20 and commentators often identify the de novo standard of
review as the villain principally responsible for high reversal rates and
other uncertainties surrounding claim construction.2
14. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (cataloging
conflicting Federal Circuit opinions on the issue).
15. Id. at 977, 979.
16. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,377,390 (1996).
17. Id. at 390.
18. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d I448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
19. Id. at 1456. Several judges of the Federal Circuit, while agreeing with the standard of review
enunciated in Cybor, have maintained that in practice the court accords weight to a well-reasoned
claim construction by the district judge. See, e.g., id. at 1462-63 (Plager, J., concurring); id. at 1463
(Bryson, J., concurring).
20. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever
I am convinced of the futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the
falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual component.").
2 I. Chu, supra, note 5, at I 1t3; M. Reed Staheli, Deserved Deference: Reconsidering the De Novo
Standard of Review for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 198-99 (1999); see also
District Judge Young's Comments Before the ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, 72 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 238 (June 20, 2006).
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II. INDETERMINACY AND DISSENT
A. INTERPRETATION AND INDETERMINACY
For the most part, the debate over claim construction has not been
about outcomes; few argue that the Federal Circuit systematically
interprets patent claims too narrowly or too broadly. The debate has
been over the claim construction process itself. Criticism of the Federal
Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence assumes many forms:
commentators most frequently speak of "unpredictability,"
"uncertainty," "confusion," and the court's failure to bring about
"uniformity" to this aspect of the law. While different commentators may
mean different things when they refer to these unhappy states, they all
may be taken to cluster around a single norm: the assertion that the legal
regime governing claim construction disputes is indeterminate. Now,
"indeterminate" and "determinate" are loaded words and little can be
accomplished without first setting out what we mean by them. My
concern in this work is not whether claims do or do not have definite
meaning, nor is it whether a regime of claim construction free of
ambiguity is possible in the abstract. My concern is practical: whether
participants in the patent system can adequately predict the scope of a
patent's claims. When I speak of indeterminacy, I am speaking of what
Kress termed epistemological indeterminacy: not whether there is law,
but whether the law can be known." That is, whether it can be known by
those people whose concern it is to determine the scope of patent rights:
lawyers advising clients, and judges deciding cases. To paraphrase one of
the formulations of epistemological determinacy provided by Kress23 : a
question of claim construction would be epistemologically determinate if
the "right"24 construction would be arrived at by most reasonable judges
and lawyers using a proper method of legal reasoning.
This definition of determinacy is highly operational, presuming
interpreters embedded in a particular interpretive community, and the
context of a particular dispute. It is also observational and outcome-
driven: I do not differentiate at this stage between reasons why judges
and lawyers might not reach the same outcome. Participants may
disagree on the facts; they may agree on facts but disagree on whether or
which principle constrains the outcome upon those facts; they may agree
that existing principles do not constrain the outcome but disagree on
what new principles should be supplied; they may agree upon the facts
and substantive principles but disagree on the procedures to be
22. Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 134, 138 (i99o).
23. Id. at 139.
24. Like other interpretive questions in law, interpretation of claims takes place not in the
abstract, but in the service of a particular dispute over infringement, validity, or enforceability of the
patent.
[VOL. 58:1025
THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT
employed in reaching the outcome. All these disagreements contribute to
uncertainty in case outcomes, and I place them all on equal footing. My
concern is solely the degree to which the entire legal regime governing
claim construction-substance, procedure, and everything else-permits
multiple outcomes upon a particular set of facts. If the law is sufficiently
determinate, predictability and certainty ought to follow; if most
participants within the system would agree that one outcome is the "right
answer," then the predictions of lawyers, the judgments of the district
courts, and the rulings of the Federal Circuit ought to correspond.
Consequently, while critics of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence may or
may not be explicitly asserting that the law of claim construction is
indeterminate, an epistemologically determinate system would seem to
satisfy most of their objections.
If the alarm over the state of claim construction law is, at its core, a
worry that the current regime of claim construction is indeterminate, how
may we evaluate that indeterminacy? The underpinning of this Article is
the thesis that the frequency of disagreement between judges-the
frequency of dissenting opinions-can be used to measure the
indeterminacy of legal regimes or legal issues resolved by appellate
judges. By comparing the frequencies with which dissents occur, we may
estimate the relative indeterminacy of different bodies of law.
The notion that disagreement and dissenting opinions signal the
presence of indeterminacy is not original. Cardozo may have said it first,
and certainly most elegantly: "The closeness of the division attests the
measure of the doubt."2 Dworkin framed Law's Empire as a work about
disagreement,, 6 although he had relatively little to say about the nature of
disagreement itself. Kress and D'Amato debated whether low dissent
rates at appellate courts signaled that law is determinate, or actually
proved the law to be indeterminate.27 However, there has been no
systematic attempt to use disagreement as a probe of legal
indeterminacy. To quantitatively assess legal indeterminacy, we must ask
if we can take Cardozo literally. In other words, does division measure
doubt?
25. State ex rel. Hayes v. McLaughlin, 16o N.E. 357, 358 (N.Y. 1928).
26. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 3-11 (1986).
27. See Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminary with One Bold
Thought, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 113, i14-i5 (i99o); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283,
324 (1989). D'Amato argues that dissents are rare because judges recognize that decisions are
"reached by the brute force of majority rule" rather than the rule of law, and therefore judges see no
point in dissenting. D'Amato, supra, at 115. D'Amato's position implies that the judges who do bother
to dissent are deluding themselves: this may be why D'Amato's subsequent argument focuses more on
the claim that dissent was futile, rather than on the claim that judges know dissents to be futile.
Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 57-59 (I99o). Neither Kress nor
D'Amato has the better of the argument, for the simple reason that a dissent frequency in isolation is
meaningless. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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B. MEASURING INDETERMINACY BY DISSENT
I begin by arguing that judges of an appellate court are the best
possible subjects for an attempt to measure indeterminacy
observationally. Judges of any appellate court consider a case on the
basis of a defined set of materials presented to them by the litigants:
briefs, excerpts from the trial record and other supporting documents,
and oral argument. The judges of an appellate court therefore constitute
a set of observers presented, at the same point in time, with the same set
of facts, and the same set of legal principles, that might determine the
outcome of the case . If determinacy is defined by the extent to which
outcome is determined by a set of legal principles on a set of facts, then
there can be little better test of whether the legal principles are
determinative than to assess whether different observers arrive at the
same outcome when presented with the same legal and factual scenario. 9
If indeterminacy permits similarly situated observers to reach
different legal conclusions, we would expect that indeterminate bodies of
law would also provoke disagreements between trial judges and
appellate judges; why not then rely on reversal rates to measure
indeterminacy? Although indeterminacy ought to yield reversals as well
as dissents, appellate dissent is a superior measure. Dissent at an
appellate court measures disagreement within a small and relatively fixed
group of observers, appellate judges, while reversal rates represent
disagreements between that group and a larger and more variable
population of trial judges. Moreover, the reviewing court and the
reviewed court do not necessarily decide cases on the basis of the same
set of facts and principles. Disagreement between judges occupying
different positions in the legal system may arise not because the law is
indeterminate with respect to a given dispute, but because they view the
dispute from different vantage points, and a measure based on reversal
may overstate the effect of indeterminate law. Even if the appellate
judges disagree with the trial court, they may nonetheless affirm its
decision under a deferential standard of review; reversal rates will
therefore vary across bodies of law for reasons unrelated to the
28. Appellate judges may, of course, reach beyond the materials provided by the litigants to
obtain principles, or even facts, not obtained by their colleagues. In such cases, the judicial actors are
not deciding the case on the same basis as each other. Such divergences are expected to be minor if
judges share such inputs with each other either informally, in conference and discussion with each
other, or formally, by relying on them in their written opinions.
29. C. Herman Pritchett, whose studies of the Supreme Court pioneered the analysis of judicial
voting in political science, reached the same conclusion, though his interest was in the behavior of the
judges when freed from legal constraint rather than the legal constraint itself. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT,
THE ROOSEVELT COURT 240 (1948) ("It is, consequently, only where the Court's decision is not
unanimous that there is genuine assurance that the result was influenced by judicial preferences as to
public policy. For here we see judges, working with an identical set of facts, and with roughly
comparable training in the law, coming to different conclusions.").
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indeterminacy of the legal question ab initio. Likewise, considerations of
judicial economy, comity or repose may lead reviewing courts to
suppress some proportions of their disagreement with the reviewed
tribunal.
Of course, similar criticisms may be leveled against a study of
disagreement between appellate judges. Appellate judges at the same
level of the judicial system may suppress some disagreements with each
other because they believe disagreement and dissent are detrimental to
the law or to their court. Well-known anecdotal examples of such
attitudes include John Marshall's insistence on unanimous opinions in
the United States Supreme Court,3  and Learned Hand's view that
dissent "cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends."3' Appellate judges,
when interviewed, maintain that they seek to reach consensus even if it
means compromising on their own view of how a case should be
decided.32 But this desire for consensus is but one of a host of "extra-
legal" factors that political scientists have hypothesized to affect the
incidence of dissent in the United States judicial system.33 Other factors
include organizational and institutional variables, such as size of the
court, professionalism of the court34 , workload, heterogeneity of judicial
background, the court's leadership, inter-court relations, and the internal
political process of the court;3" the social and political background against
which the judges work, including degree of the jurisdiction's
urbanization, lack of a societal consensus on controversial issues, or
periods during which social values are in flUx; 3 6 and of course, individual
characteristics of judges, including ideology, social background, and
perceptions of the judicial role.37
If all these factors, which we might call "structural variables,"
contribute to the incidence of dissent, is it reasonable to assume that the
frequency of judicial disagreement reflects the determinacy of the law
itself? Or will the contribution of legal indeterminacy to dissent be
obscured by these extra-legal factors? We must first recognize that
despite the impressive array of hypotheses amassed in the political
science literature to explain dissenting behavior, few have been verified
30. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 295 (ist Owl Books ed.
x998).
31. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958).
32. Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIs.
L. REV. 461, 477-78.
33. See Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in American Courts, 43 J. POL. 412,414-15 (1981).
34. I.e., factors such as organization of the court, policies of judicial selection and retention,
administration of the court, and judicial pay. See id. at 415.
35. See id at 414-20.
36. Id. at 420-21
37. Id. at 421-23.
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by observation. According to one survey, only a few of these factors have
been directly or indirectly shown to affect the frequency of dissent: the
attitude that dissent is harmful to the court, the existence of intermediate
appellate courts, the degree of urbanization of the jurisdiction, the
judge's ideological orientation, and the workload of the court." However,
even among those factors that have been shown to affect the, frequency
of dissent, contrary findings exist.39
Certainly the influence of structural variables limits how much
information can be extracted from a study of judicial dissent. Most
significantly, it highlights the need for a comparative approach. The
observation that judges disagree with each other I%, io%, or ioo% of
the time means nothing in isolation, because that frequency reflects a
contribution both from the indeterminacy of the legal regime and from
organizational, institutional, or personal factors."0 Neither the magnitude
nor the direction of the contribution of the extra-legal factors can be
determined from dissent frequencies alone. Without an independent
measure of the structural variables, the only way to draw strong
conclusions about legal indeterminacy is to compare the frequency of
dissent at the same court4' between different fields of law. If the identity
of the court is held constant, then variations in dissent frequency should
be driven by variations in the legal regimes governing the court's
decision, and not the characteristics of the court and its judges.4"
38. Peterson regards the first four as having been directly confirmed to affect the frequency of
dissent; the hypothesis that increasing workload decreases dissent he regards as "indirectly"
confirmed. Id. at 423-24 & tbl.I. Peterson also views the hypothesis that difficult questions of law
produce more dissent to have been indirectly confirmed. Id.
39. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb, Epilogue to JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS 275, 285 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986) (discussing studies
contradicting in part earlier findings that increased caseload suppresses judicial dissent).
40. Perhaps the only useful metric is the following: in a case comprising only a single issue, that
issue having two outcomes with equally likely probabilities, we would expect dissents in one-fourth
(25%) of cases adjudicated by three-judge panels, if judges always express disagreement in the form of
a dissent. It is unlikely that any case ever satisfies these conditions.
41. As discussed infra Part VI, comparing dissent frequencies between courts is difficult, because
the contribution of extra-legal factors need not be (and is likely not) constant among different courts.
The confounding effects of extra-legal factors may be minimized by comparing courts sharing the same
organizational characteristics (e.g., comparing the United States Courts of Appeals with each other),
but discrepancies between institutional cultures and judges' personal characteristics complicate
comparisons between different courts.
42. A more accurate statistic would be a judge's individual dissent frequency when considering a
particular aspect of law, normalized for that judge's overall tendency to dissent. Normalization to a
judge's overall dissent frequency would eliminate bias in the measured frequencies of dissent arising
from a judge's general tendency to agree or disagree with his or her colleagues, although random
assignment of judges to cases ought to eliminate such bias. More significantly, the distribution of
normalized individual dissent frequencies for a given aspect of the law would permit us to determine
whether a high frequency of dissent in a particular field of law reflects indeterminacy of the law, or an
assumed ideological bias of a particular judge that generates increased disagreement with his or her
colleagues when deciding cases presenting that aspect of the law. That is, if each judge dissents on a
[V01. 58:1025
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C. CONDITIONS OF VALIDITY FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF INDETERMINACY
BY DISSENT
We may set forth precisely, though not quantitatively, the conditions
under which a study of dissent frequency is valid as a measure of
determinacy of a set of legal principles. First, and obviously, judicial
decision-making must be in part determined by the legal principles. If
judicial behavior is not significantly constrained by legal principles, then
a study of judicial behavior does not provide any information about
those legal principles. Thus, the thesis of radical indeterminacy cannot be
true for a study such as this to be valid; judges must behave at least some
of the time as if they make decisions based on legal principles they are
constrained to obey.43
Second, individual characteristics of judges must cause them to
disagree with each other on the disposition of at least some cases.'
Without disagreements, there are of course no dissents, and it would be
impossible to conclude that the legal principles are indeterminate. Less
obviously, the converse is not true. That is, an absence of judicial
disagreement does not necessarily indicate that the legal principles are
determinate. A court composed of absolutely identical judges would
always agree with each other unless the process of judicial decision was
purely stochastic. Therefore, if indeterminacy is to be revealed through
judicial disagreement, judges must possess individual characteristics that
cause them to reach different conclusions when presented with the same
set of facts and the same set of legal principles.
Third, disagreements between judges must be expressed at least
some of the time in the form of dissents. If the legal principles allow
judges to reach different conclusions, and the judges do in fact reach
different conclusions due to their individual characteristics, but the
particular issue with approximately equal frequency (after normalizing for each judge's overall
"agreeableness" or "disagreeableness), we might conclude that dissent on that issue reflects solely the
determinacy of the legal regime. In contrast, if the dissents are distributed such that a few judges
contribute disproportionately to the court's overall frequency of dissent on that issue, we might
conclude that dissent reflects more idiosyncratic positions of individual judges.
43. Conversely, at least some cases must be under-determined to permit judges to reach different
conclusions about their resolution; if all cases were so clear as to permit only one outcome, no dissents
would appear.
44. Even without disagreement between judges about how a particular case should be resolved, it
is theoretically possible to ascertain "hidden disagreement" between panels of an appellate court
considering similar cases; panel composition data can then be used to extract an estimate of each
judge's position on a particular issue. Such measurements obviously require subjective coding of case
outcomes, since the methodology relies on conflicting outcomes between panels considering similar
cases. See Burton Atkins & Justin Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or
Reality?, 2o Am. J. POL. SCI. 735, 742-45 (1976); Donald Songer, Consensual and Nonconsensual
Decisions in Unanimous Opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 225, 226-
27 (i982). Less obviously, such studies assume the condition that different cases provide similar
opportunities for expression of judicial discretion.
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judges fail to express their disagreement in the form of a dissent, then a
study of dissents will underestimate the determinacy of the legal regime.
Fourth, for a comparative study of courts that resolve cases by
subsets of the court (i.e., panels), the absolute incidence of overall
indeterminacy or disagreement cannot be overly large. The need for this
condition to prevail may not be immediately apparent, but follows from
essentially statistical grounds and the argument advanced in connection
with the second condition of validity. In any underdetermined case,
whether or not a dissent will be produced will depend on the particular
combination of judges considering the case and the individual
characteristics of those judges. Thus, random assignment of judges to a
panel may determine whether or not a particular case generates a
dissent. If the proportion of underdetermined cases is large, then
differences between dissent rates in various fields of law may reflect only
an uneven distribution of judges on the panels hearing cases in those
fields. These effects will diminish as the number of cases included in the
study increases.
Fifth and finally, for a comparative study, the extent to which the
contribution of extra-legal factors to the frequency of dissent changes
when judges are confronted with different kinds of cases must be
relatively small. If judges follow similar decision-making processes in all
cases, then the comparative frequency with which they disagree in
different fields of the law will reflect the determinacy of those fields.
Judges A and B may disagree in underdetermined cases because of
ideological differences, but that is no obstacle to identifying the
underdetermined cases by judicial disagreement. Suppose, however, that
Judge A follows "ordinary" decision-making processes in most fields of
law, but always rules in favor of one class of litigant in one category of
cases. That category of cases will register a higher dissent frequency than
other categories, at least to the extent that the other categories are free
from idiosyncratic behavior of Judge A's colleagues. To the extent that
indeterminacy is defined solely empirically-the existence of different
outcomes on identical law and fact, without reference to the process by
which judges arrive at those resolutions-then differential behavior
across categories of cases is unobjectionable. If Judge A never votes in
favor of the death penalty, then the outcome of all capital cases may
depend on whether Judge A hears the case. However, if we consider the
case of the idiosyncratic judge not to reflect indeterminacy-perhaps
because we think we have some way of identifying the "correct" outcome
of capital cases that does not require us to take Judge A's behavior into
account-then the presence of an idiosyncratic judge confounds a
measure of determinacy by comparing dissent frequencies.45
45. If such idiosyncrasies are exercised evenly across the different categories of cases-whether
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Having defined the conditions under which a study of dissent rates is
valid as a measure of determinacy, we may now ask to what extent those
conditions are fulfilled. The first three conditions-the requirement of at
least partial legal determinacy; differentiation of judges' decision-making
characteristics; and the expression of disagreement in dissent-describe
the relationship between judicial input and judicial output. As such, they
relate to the internal decision-making process of the judge and are
difficult to disaggregate by any study of judicial behavior. Nonetheless,
the second and third conditions seem easily met: obviously judges are not
identical, and the appearance of judicial dissents indicates that judges do
disagree and express their disagreement in dissents at least some of the
time. Some evidence also supports these intuitions: At the Circuit Courts
of Appeals, behavioral analysis of judges' dissent frequency, when paired
with judges of similar or dissimilar voting behavior, has suggested that
neither jurisprudential norms of unanimity, nor psychological pressures
to conform, inhibit judges from expressing disagreement in the form of a
dissent.46
With regard to the first condition, the constraining effect of legal
principles, I have no intention of enlarging the voluminous theoretical
literature debating the merits of indeterminacy theses.47 I confine myself
to the question of to what extent legal principles have been shown to
constrain the judicial decision-making process. Operationally, the
satisfaction of this condition is easy to define: it requires that a change in
the legal regime that nominally constrains judges (such as statute,
precedent of a higher court, or precedent from one's own court that
cannot be overruled) leads to a change in the outcomes of the cases
decided under that regime. Actually assessing this condition is another
matter entirely. One approach to assessing the validity of the first
condition independently of judicial behavior might be to ask the judges
themselves how they decide cases. When interviewed, judges of the
Circuit Courts of Appeals have reported that they follow precedent of
the Supreme Court even when they disagree with it, although fidelity to
the precedent of their own court is less certain."' We might regard the
expression of such attitudes as evidence for the validity of the first
condition. Obviously, however, judges' self-reported attitudes may or
by the same judge, or by different judges-this problem disappears.
46. Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Toward Conformity in a Three Member
Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54 Soc. SCL Q. 41, 52-53
(0973) ("Though in most instances the judges do conform [when placed on a panel with two other
judges who tend to vote together], the frequency of dissent is substantial enough in [this] condition to
suggest that these judges are neither conforming to group pressure nor adhering to a jurisprudential
norm of legal harmony.").
47. See Lawrence Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 488-502 (Dennis Pattersen ed., 1999).
48. Goldman, supra note 32, at 476-77.
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may not reflect their actual decision-making processes. The only reliable
indication of judicial thinking is what can be determined from judicial
behavior: the validity of the first three conditions aggregated together.
The question therefore becomes to what extent actual studies of judicial
behavior support the thesis that judicial disagreement in the form of
dissents reflects indeterminacy of the law.
The formal model that legal indeterminacy permits judicial
disagreement is usually ascribed4 9 to Pritchett's studies of the United
States Supreme Court. 0 Certainly by now, the thesis that judicial
disagreement reflects the exercise of judicial discretion in cases where
the law does not determine the outcome has by now been accepted as
true, at least by political scientists who study intermediate appellate
courts. As summarized by Songer, Sheehan and Haire:
Analyses of the decision-making patterns of American courts have
generally operated on the assumption that a substantial portion of the
docket for courts below the Supreme Court has consisted of "easy"
cases in which the legal texts are determinative so that judges,
regardless of their personal preferences, will mechanically apply the
law. In such cases, judges' policy preferences can be expected to be
irrelevant to the decision making process. However, judicial decisions
do not appear to be constrained by legal texts in a substantial number
of cases. A wide variety of analyses have reinforced the conclusion of
appeals court scholar Sheldon Goldman that some cases present judges
"with choice citations sufficient to alter the outcomes while other cases
do not." While there is no agreement as to precisely how many such
"hard" cases exist, it is reasonable to assume that judicial discretion
exists at least in all "non-consensual" decisions of the courts. This lack
of consensus is evident when at least one circuit court judge who heard
the case dissents or the circuit court reverses the decision below. In
either of these situations, the existence of disagreement among some
judges would indicate that all of the judges who participated in the
processing of the case exercised discretion as they determined which
side should prevail."
The notion that indeterminate cases present opportunities for the
49. See Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges: A
Comment on Joel Grossman's Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions, 31 J. POL. 214, 217 (1969)
("Pritchett over two decades ago persuasively argued that cases decided with public judicial
disagreement can be considered to have presented the judges with choices among limited alternatives.
Judicial dissensus is thus taken as an objective indicator that presumably legitimate conflicting paths to
decision were open to the judges.... Dissensual case situations are characterized for the most part
(but not exclusively) by the judge's attitudes/values toward the substantive issues influencing the
decisional path taken.").
50. See PRITCHET, supra note 29, at 30 (1948) (ascribing increase in Supreme Court dissent to
increase in "hard cases").
51. DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 104-05 (2000) (citations omitted); accord VIRGINIA A. HETTNGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A
COLLEGIAL COURT 115 (2006) ("Horizontal dissensus is a reflection of the indeterminacy of legal
rules .... When political scientists discuss nonunanimous decisions ... they are often referring to such
rule indeterminacy.").
[Vol. 58:1o25
THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT
exercise of judicial discretion-and hence disagreement-seems
intuitive; it also finds at least indirect support from studies on the fate of
legal rules announced in contested opinions.52 Less obvious, but no less
important for a correlation between determinacy and dissent, is the
notion that apparent judicial agreement reflects the constraint of legal
principles. Does the absence of dissent indicate determinacy? A lack of
dissent might merely reflect a coincidence of the values or attitudes that
lead a judge to decide one way or the other in an indeterminate case,
rather than the constraining effect of legal principles. 3
Analysis of unanimous judicial opinions is inherently more difficult
than analysis of opinions with dissent, 4 and requires the researcher to
score cases based on their outcome rather than merely noting the
expression of disagreement. Nonetheless, analysis of the correlations
between judicial "liberalism" and outcome in unanimous and split labor
opinions of the United States Courts of Appeals has suggested that
judicial attitudes and values play little role in the resolution of
unanimously decided cases.5 The implication is that, if judicial
characteristics do not account for the outcome of the unanimously
decided cases, then the most likely explanation is that legal principles
dictated the outcome of the unanimous cases. 6
52. As part of an inquiry into what factors caused judges on the United States Courts of Appeals
to follow or reject rules promulgated by earlier decisions, Klein evaluated (among other factors) the
treatment of rules announced in unanimous and split opinions, and the relationship between ideology
of the earlier and later judges. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 139-41 (20o2). Klein concluded that dissents were better explained as indicators of legally
problematic issues, rather than indicators of ideological conflict. Id.
53. See PRITCHETT, supra note 29, at 240; Goldman, supra note 49, at 218. Coincidence of judicial
values or attitudes is problematic for this study only to the extent that it manifests differentially
between the categories of cases examined.
54. See generally Justin J. Green, Parameters of Dissensus on Shifting Small Groups, in JUDICIAL
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, supra note 39, at 139, 139-41, 147-51.
55. See Goldman, supra note 49, at 219-20.
56. See id. Goldman also identifies support for the "consensus proposition" (the proposition that
legal principles dictate the outcome of unanimously decided cases) in studies of the U.S. Supreme
Court. See id. at 220-21. Additionally, we may postulate three other circumstances in which a lack of
dissent among appellate judges fails to reflect the indeterminacy of the law. The first is when opinions,
though ostensibly the product of a multi-judge court, are in fact the product of only one judge, in
which case no disagreement is possible. Frequently cited is Sickels's study of zoning cases decided by
the Maryland Court of Appeals, in which court practice assigned zoning cases to individual judges in
rotation, despite their nominal consideration by the entire court. See Robert J. Sickels, The Illusion of
Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals, 59 AM. POL. Sci. REV. ioo,
i0o-o4 (1965). The second is when individual panels reach unanimous decisions that are nonetheless
opposed to the decisions of other panels of the same court. See Atkins & Green, supra note 44, at 735-
48; Songer, supra note 44, at 225-39. The third circumstance is when judges disagree but suppress
disagreement or reach a negotiated compromise. See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., On the Fluidity of
Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 43, 43-55 (1968). So long as these circumstances occur equally
frequently among the fields of law under study, none of them interferes with a study comparing
resolution of different kinds of cases within the same court.
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But that unanimous opinions emerge from cases in which legal
principles dictate outcome, and that dissenting opinions emerge from
cases where the legal principles are under-determinative are insufficient
support for the validity of this study. It is also necessary, as expressed in
the fourth and fifth conditions of validity, that variations in dissent rates
reflect variations in the determinacy of the legal regimes being
compared. The mere existence of variation in dissent rates between fields
of law, between periods of time, or between similar courts, says little by
itself. Dissent rates might vary; but this variation might reflect variation
in the characteristics of judges that cause them to disagree on the
resolution of underdetermined cases, rather than differences in the
determinacy of the cases being compared.57
We may pose two tests or predictions that ought to be satisfied if
variations in dissent rates are the result of variations in the determinacy
of the legal regimes under study. The first is positive: Changes in the type
of case being considered, more specifically changes in the determinacy of
the legal regime as assessed by some independent criterion, should yield
changes in the rate of judicial dissent. The second is negative: Variations
in dissent rates should not be entirely explained by variables other than
the legal regime in question, such as the structural characteristics of the
courts or the individual characteristics of the judges. If systematic
variation remains that cannot be explained by structural variables, it
becomes more likely that variations in dissent rate correlate with
variation in the determinacy of the legal regime.
Testing the positive prediction is difficult, for the obvious reason
that we have no outcome-independent method of assessing whether a
particular case was undetermined or not.5 Nonetheless, several indirect
tests of this prediction may be found in studies that have examined the
relationship between dissent and an appellate court's discretion to
control its own docket. On the theory that appellate courts with
discretionary dockets will eschew "easy" cases in favor of ones that pose
unsettled or difficult questions of law, we might expect higher rates of
dissent when courts exercise discretion over which appeals they will hear.
The distinction between appeal by leave and appeal by right has
frequently been suggested as a reason for the much higher frequency of
57. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals 1961-
1964, 6o AM. POL. Sc. REV. 374,378 (1966).
58. One could imagine an experimental approach to evaluating determinacy, such as providing a
defined set of facts and legal constraints to a group of legally trained observers and assessing whether
the observers reached identical conclusions. But aside from the difficulties defining and recruiting a
qualified group of legal observers, it is difficult to see how such an experiment could yield information
beyond the determinacy of the exact legal and factual materials provided to the observers. Such
materials might or might not correspond to the actual set of legal and factual materials considered by
judges.
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dissent observed in the United States Supreme Court than in the United
States Courts of Appeals." But a stronger test would be to compare
dissent frequencies between discretionary and non-discretionary cases in
the same court. 60 Such a study has been conducted on the Louisiana
Supreme Court, in which prior to 1982, appeal was by leave in civil cases
but by right in criminal cases.6' Dissents arose more frequently in civil
cases than criminal cases," suggesting that the discretionary civil appeals
were underdetermined compared to the "routine" criminal appeals. 3
However, once statutory changes made the court's criminal docket
discretionary, the frequency of dissent in criminal appeals approached
closely that observed in the civil appeals.6' Additional support for this
hypothesis may be found by comparing frequencies of dissent between
state supreme courts that exercise control over their dockets and those
supreme courts whose jurisdiction is obligatory.66 After controlling for
other variables,6 ' analysis of dissent frequencies shows that state supreme
courts exercising control over their dockets register higher frequencies of
dissent than do state supreme courts which have no control over their
dockets. 6 Thus, to the extent that the exercise of state supreme court
judges' discretion to hear an appeal correlates with the indeterminacy of
the legal principles presented by that case, the connection between
exercise of docket control and dissent provides strong support for the
hypothesis that variations in determinacy correlate with variations in
dissent frequencies.
69
59. See, e.g., Goldman & Lamb, supra note 39, at 9-To.
6o. Such a test avoids the obvious complications in comparing the U.S. Courts of Appeals, which
usually sit in panels of three judges and are bound to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court, and
the Supreme Court, which sits with nine judges and is not bound by a higher court.
61. See Melinda Gann Hall, Docket Control as an Influence on Judicial Voting, 10 JUST. SYS. J.
243, 245-46 (1985).
62. Prior to 1982, dissents arose in 52.6% of the civil cases but in only 21.6% of the criminal cases.
Id. at 250.
63. Id. Hall was unable to identify consistent patterns of individual judges' voting in her analysis,
suggesting that expression of judges' policy preferences played little role in the non-unanimous cases.
Id. at 251-53.
64. Id. at 246 n.8.
65. Id. at 252 (reporting that in 1984-85, 58.6% of criminal appeals and 61.4% of civil appeals
were decided unanimously).
66. See Henry R. Glick & George W. Pruet, Jr., Dissent in State Supreme Courts: Patterns and
Correlates of Conflict, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, supra note 39, at 199, 208.
67. Glick and Pruet's analysis assessed as independent variables various measures of state social
and economic complexity, political complexity and competition, and complexity of court structure. Id.
at 205-o8.
68. Id. at 206 (finding statistically significant zero order correlation between jurisdiction of
supreme court and dissent frequency).
69. For a contrary example from Australia, see Russel Smyth, What Explains Variations in
Dissent Rates?: Time Series Evidence from the High Court, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 221, 238 (2004) (finding
no significant correlation between introduction of discretion and increased dissent on Australia's High
Court).
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A further test of the positive hypothesis is to compare dissent
frequencies between categories of cases thought to be more or less
determinate. The difficulty, of course, is that the validity of such a test is
entirely dependent on the subjective judgment of the researcher that a
particular field of law is relatively underdetermined. Nonetheless,
moderately strong support for this prediction may be found in the three-
fold increase in dissent in cases of obligatory jurisdiction at the United
States Supreme Court after 1925, after the Judiciary Act eliminated
obligatory jurisdiction for most "routine" federal law cases.7 ° The
increase indicates that, at least at the United States Supreme Court, cases
involving more complex principles of law7' are more likely to generate
judicial disagreement." Somewhat more tenuous support for this
prediction might be drawn from studies of the United States Courts of
Appeals, showing that dissent is more frequent in cases for which
Supreme Court review was granted or sought.73 If indeterminate
questions of law prompt litigants to seek Supreme Court review, or
prompt the Supreme Court to grant review, then the increased frequency
of dissent in such cases serves as a marker for indeterminacy.74
In sum, while no single study confirms the positive test of the
relationship between determinacy and dissent, taken together, existing
empirical work supports the notion that dissent increases in proportion
to certain properties of the legal regime under study. To the extent that
these properties are proxies for determinacy of the legal regime in
question, we may regard as satisfied the condition that less determinate
70. Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity, the Judges' Bill and the Role
of the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 0 W. POL. Q. 471, 475 (1977) (finding that percentage of obligatory cases
generating dissents increased from 8.2% to 25.t% after the Judiciary Act, while the frequency of
dissent in certiorari cases only increased from 7.6% to 8.3%); see also id. at 474 n.23 (cataloging fields
of law for which appeal by leave replaced appeal by right).
71. The categories of cases for which appeal by right was eliminated included most general
federal question cases, postal cases, civil rights cases, and cases brought by the United States. See
Orely Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 25 7 --81 (995).
72. See Halpern & Vines, supra note 70, at 475 ("The increased dissent rate in obligatory cases is
explained by the fact that the Act eliminated appeal as a matter of right in numerous classes of cases
which generally raised relatively straightforward legal issues."). The observation that appeals classified
as involving "public" law-as opposed to "private" or "criminal" law-tended to generate more
dissent at the Arizona Supreme Court over a sixty-year period reinforces, albeit weakly, these
conclusions. See John A. Stookey, A Longitudinal Study of the Docket Composition Theory of Conflict
and Consensus, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, supra note 39, at 240, 245. Whether "public"
cases are more complex than "private" or "criminal" cases is open to question. See id. at 251.
73. See Donald A. Songer, Factors Affecting Variation in Rates of Dissent in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, supra note 39, at 117, 122-23. (finding significant
increases in dissent in labor and criminal law cases where Supreme Court review was sought or
granted).
74. The obvious difficulty with this interpretation is that the expression of dissent at the appellate
court may well independently encourage litigants to appeal to the Supreme Court, or the Supreme
Court to hear the case.
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cases provoke increased expression of judicial dissent.
The negative test or prediction of the hypothesis is that variations in
the dissent frequency for a particular system cannot be explained, at least
not entirely, by changes in structural variables such as the personal
characteristics of the judges, or structural characteristics of the court. At
the United States Supreme Court, dissent frequencies vary significantly
depending on the justices' ideological attitudes and social backgrounds.75
However, such variables have much less success explaining variations in
dissent frequencies at the United States Courts of Appeals. 76 Perhaps the
most comprehensive study of the effect of judicial background,
Goldman's examination of all non-unanimous Court of Appeals
decisions from 1965 to I97I, 77 found that all judicial background
variables78 collectively explained only 5.5% of the variance in judges'
frequency of dissent.79 Likewise, a study of dissent frequencies in criminal
and labor cases at the Courts of Appeals from 1953 to I97580 found no
significant connections between dissent frequency and the court's
workload8' or diversity of political party membership on the panel.2
Consistent with these findings, studies of case outcomes at the
Courts of Appeals (as compared to studies that record judicial
disagreement without regard to how the case was decided) s3 have found
75. See Peterson, supra note 33, at 421-22.
76. While not assessing the question directly, Klein's conclusion that legal indeterminacy rather
than ideological conflict better explained the subsequent fate of dissenting opinions may be relevant
here as well. See KLEIN, supra note 52, at 139-41.
77. Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM.
POL. ScL REV. 491, 491-5o6 (1975).
78. Namely, political party, age, religion, prior experience as a candidate for public office, prior
judicial service, length of service on the Court of Appeals, and prior experience as a prosecutor. Id. at
50.
79. See id. at 5oo-oi. Prior judicial experience was the variable explaining most of the variance in
dissent frequency, accounting for 2.4% of the variance. Id. at 503.
80. Songer, supra note 73, at II7.
81. Id. at 125-26. These findings contradicted the hypothesis that busy judges would be less
inclined to take the time to prepare dissents.
82. Id. at 128. However, reversing the decision of the district court, diversity of 'judicial ideology'
on the panel, and degree of urbanization of the circuit in question, were shown to correlate
significantly with the observed frequencies of dissent. Id. at 135. These variables did not, however,
account for changes in dissent frequencies over time. Id. at 126-35. Curiously, Songer does not explain
what 'ideology' is or how it was determined. Id. at 126-28. His reference to Atkins, id. at 126-28, might
suggest that a process similar to Atkins's was followed: identify judicial voting blocks by analysis of en
banc decisions, and then ascertain the frequency with which judges dissent when they are placed on
panels with members of the same or different voting blocs. See Atkins, supra note 56, at 46-49. If so,
the finding that diversity of judicial ideology provokes dissent might appear (to the uninitiated) to be
the relatively trivial observation that judges who tend to disagree with each other when the court sits
en banc, still disagree with each other when the court sits in panels of three.
83. Studies of outcomes require analysis and subjective coding of the outcome of the case. For
example, outcomes of private economic cases may be coded according to whether "underdogs"
(insureds, small businesses, antitrust plaintiffs, tenants, debtors, bankrupts, buyers of goods, or
stockholders) or their opposites (insurers, large business, antitrust defendants, landlords, creditors,
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relatively modest correlations between outcome and judicial
characteristics. Other than political party, religion, and age, demographic
characteristics of Court of Appeals judges have little or no effect on case
outcomes. 84 Even the effects of party, religion and age are small.85 Even
stronger conclusions have been drawn from studies at the district court
level. A study86 of all civil rights and prisoner cases filed in three federal
district courts 87 accounting for a significant proportion of federal filing
for the study period,s found some influence of individual judges on
procedure, but little on outcome.89 Even the effects exerted by individual
judges could not be significantly correlated with the judges' individual
characteristics (such as political party or appointing president), leading
the authors to conclude: "In the mass of cases that are filed, even civil
rights and prisoner cases, the law-not the judge-dominates the
outcomes.'
Recent theories of judicial behavior have added strategic behavior-
defined as instances in which a judge's decision is based in whole or in
part on the expected behavior or response of her colleagues, rather than
solely according to her own view of the case-to the repertoire of factors
that might contribute to judicial decision-making.9 Strategic behavior
could interfere with the correlation of indeterminacy and dissent,
sellers of goods, or management) prevailed. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 57, at 376. While a fairly
standard mode of analysis in political science, such classifications are obviously crude and may fail to
recognize many subtle distinctions or biases acted upon by judges.
84. Id. at 381-82. (finding no correlation between outcome and judges' place of birth, paternal
occupation, type of educational institution attended, prior public office held, district court experience,
bar association leadership, occupation when appointed, length of judicial experience, or ABA
qualification rating).
85. Goldman's 1965 to 1971 study found that the variance in outcome explained by seven
combined variables of judicial background (political party, age, religion, years of service on the court,
and prior experience as a judge, candidate for public office, or prosecutor) ranged from a high of
37.1% in labor cases, to a low of 7.7% in government fiscal cases, an amount he regarded as "far from
spectacular." Goldman, supra note 77, at 5oi. Goldman ultimately concluded: "On balance, party and
age seemed to have some limited importance in explaining the variance in judicial behavior, and the
other background variables appeared negligible (with the possible exception of religion)." Id. at 505.
Goldman's overall assessment was distinctly lukewarm: "These findings lend some slight
encouragement to background-behavior research at the aggregate level." Id.
86. Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on
Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 265-66 (1995).
87. The Central District of California, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Northern
District of Georgia. Id. at 265.
88. The study examined all cases filed in the three specified districts in 1981. According to the
authors, during the period 198o-1981 these three districts accounted for 8.s% of all federal
nonbankruptcy filings, and 7.9% and 4.2% of nonprisoner and prisoner civil rights filings respectively.
Id.
89. Id. at 281 ("We find that judges influence the procedures within civil rights cases but have
relatively little effect on whether cases settle or win. Further, judicial characteristics such as political
party cannot explain what few effects we see.").
9o. Id.
91. For review, see Hettinger et al., supra note 51, at 175-78.
[Vol. 58:1025
THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT
because the decision to dissent would be based in part on considerations
other than the judge's view of the correct disposition of the case.
However, a large-scale study of dissenting opinions in cases at the United
States Courts of Appeals from 1970 to 1988, based essentially on the
theory that the dissenting judge employs dissent as a plea for en banc
review from a more (or less) sympathetic court majority, found no
evidence of strategic behavior in the incidence of dissent.92
D. ADVANTAGES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND OTHER INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURTS FOR THE STUDY OF DISSENT
Most studies of dissent, and judicial behavior in general, have
focused on the Supreme Court of the United States. However interesting
the Supreme Court may be for a study of judicial process, as a forum for
measuring determinacy of the law, the Supreme Court suffers from
several disadvantages shared with other courts of last resort. For courts
where appeal is by leave rather than by right, the selection of cases is
biased by the discretion of the court to hear the appeal. A court may
decline to hear an appeal for any number of reasons that may or may not
be related to the determinacy of the law.' Particularly in light of findings
that exercise of judicial discretion in the selection of appeals significantly
affects frequencies of dissent, a study of determinacy optimally should be
confined to courts in which judges do not control their dockets. The
Federal Circuit, along with other intermediate appellate courts, meets
this criterion: appeal is by right rather than by leave.9' The Federal
Circuit does retain discretion whether to hear interlocutory appeals,95
raising the possibility that selective hearing of interlocutory appeals
could bias the frequencies of dissent. 6 However, the frequency at which
the Federal Circuit grants interlocutory appeals is low enough that such
biases, if present, would be insignificant.
The second advantage of the Federal Circuit as a system for the
study of determinacy lies in the role of stare decisis at the court. When a
92. Id. at 84. Hettinger et al. did find a strong and significant correlation between the "legal
complexity" of a case and the incidence of dissent. Id. at 171 tbl.3. However, their study does not
support a correlation between indeterminacy and dissent. Hettinger et al. measured "legal complexity"
by the presence of cross-appeals and the number of issues considered. Id. at 59. The more legal issues,
the more opportunities for dissent, regardless of their determinacy. Id.
93. E.g., the case may not present an issue the court considers worthy of its attention; the legal
issues in the case may not be properly framed or may not be ripe for decision; the court wishes to wait
for further exploration of the issue in other lower court decisions; the court regards the issue as too
politically sensitive to address, etc.
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(x) (2000).
95. See id. § I292(b).
96. Such bias would only occur if tendency to grant interlocutory appeal does not correlate with
case determinacy. If the court granted interlocutory appeal with equal frequency among cases with
equal levels of indeterminacy, no bias would result. Such equivalence is likely if the court restricts
leave to file an interlocutory appeal to cases of clear error in the court below.
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court is free to overrule its earlier precedent, disagreement among judges
may arise from several distinct sources, only one of which relates directly
to the determinacy of the legal regime. Judges may disagree on whether
existing precedent or statute determines the outcome of the particular
case before the court, in which case disagreement measures
indeterminacy. But disagreement may also reflect disagreement on the
merits of the court's existing precedent, notwithstanding the clarity of
that precedent, or disagreement about the threshold at which disapproval
of the merits of the court's existing precedent justifies departing from the
principle of stare decisis.97 All three disagreements may arise when the
Federal Circuit sits en banc, in which case the decision-making process of
the court resembles that of the Supreme Court. 8 However, when the
court sits in panels, the sources of possible disagreement are fewer. Like
the other federal Circuit Courts of Appeals,99 the Federal Circuit follows
the rule (sometimes termed the principle of "interpanel accord") that the
decision of one panel of the court is binding upon subsequent panels
until the decision is overruled by the court en banc.'" With rare
exceptions,"'1 adherence to this rule means that judges in a panel are
constrained to follow the precedent established by earlier panels of the
court. Although disagreement with the existing legal regime may be
expressed in a concurring opinion, dissent as an expression of
disagreement with precedent of the court is foreclosed to a judge
following the rule of interpanel accord. In panel decisions of a court that
follows the rule of interpanel accord, dissent at least nominally is
confined to indeterminate cases: cases in which the judges disagree about
the identity or meaning of statutes or precedents that control the case, or
disagree about what principles should be promulgated when none yet
97. Compare Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992), with id. at 944
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing whether stare decisis required adherence to Roe v. Wade).
98. The Federal Circuit is, of course, still constrained to follow the precedent of the Supreme
Court.
99. See 5 AM. JUn. 20 Appellate Review § 6Oi (1962) (collecting cases).
Ioo. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 86o, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("Counsel is apparently unaware that a panel of this court is bound by prior precedential decisions
unless and until overturned in banc."). In its first decision, the Federal Circuit adopted as binding
precedent the decisions of its predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
tot. See Atd. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 838 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (declining
to follow earlier Federal Circuit panel because earlier panel allegedly did not follow Supreme Court
precedent); At. Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.zd 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (denial of
rehearing en banc) (Rich, J., dissenting) ("The most egregious act of the Atlantic panel, however, is its
defiant disregard, for the first time in this court's nearly ten-year history, of its rule that no precedent
can be disregarded or overruled save by an in banc court...."); see also Note, En Banc Hearings in
the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 563, 578-81 (1965) (noting rare cases of "panel overruling"). Interviews with Circuit Court of
Appeals judges have also revealed perceptions among some judges that fidelity to the rule of
interpanel accord is less than absolute. See Goldman, supra note 32, at 467.
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exist.
The third advantage of the Federal Circuit as a laboratory of dissent
arises from its circumscribed jurisdiction. The diversity of cases which
most courts hear complicates efforts to measure dissent rates within or
between specific fields of law. The more scattered a court's jurisdiction,
the more fields of law its decisions address. For the researcher, such
diversity is problematic because it may decrease the number of opinions
addressing a field of law-making it more difficult to draw robust
conclusions from variations in dissent rates-and because it may increase
the difficulty and subjectivity faced by the researcher in classifying cases.
Typically, empirical studies have used relatively crude categories such as
"public," "private," "criminal," "labor," or "business regulation,' .... or,
more frequently, ignored the distinction between fields of law altogether.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is delimited by a relatively
few categories of subject matter. 3 The limited scope of subject matter
makes classifying Federal Circuit cases by field of law more uniform and
less subjective. Furthermore, each field of law within the Federal
Circuit's appellate jurisdiction arises from one, or in some instances a
few, distinct tribunals. 4 The association of tribunal with field of law
facilitates first-order categorization of appeals by the field of law
addressed."5
The ability to easily categorize Federal Circuit appeals by field of
law provides the opportunity to conduct a controlled study, comparing
the rate at which Federal Circuit judges disagree on each of the fields of
law within their appellate jurisdiction. Comparing decisions of the same
102. See, e.g, SONGER, supra note 51, at io5; Goldman, supra note 57, at 376.
103. 28 U.S.C § 1295 (2000).
104. Patent infringement actions usually originate from the district courts, but proceedings to
block import of infringing articles may be brought before the International Trade Commission. See 19
U.S.C. §i33 7 (d) (2oo0). Review of Patent and Trademark Office decisions usually proceeds from
administrative boards within the Office, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) and
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2000). On occasion
review of a BPAI decision arrives at the Federal Circuit by way of a district court under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 145 or 146. The Federal Circuit also hears appeals from various agency boards of contract appeals
established under the Contracts Disputes Act. See 41 U.S.C. § 6o7(g)(I) (2oo0).
lO5. Of course, while classifying cases in such categories as "patent," "international trade," or
"veterans" is more accurate than broader categories like "civil" and "criminal," it still conceals
enormous diversity of issues within each category. A customs case from the Court of International
Trade, for example, might turn on something as esoteric as the proper accounting treatment of
research and development expenses in an antidumping proceeding, see, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor,
Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1363, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir. 2005), or as foundational as the proper degree
of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations, see, e.g., Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d
1304, 13o6-o8 (Fed. Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Is it meaningful to assess the determinacy of
"international trade" cases in light of such diversity? Perhaps not. But the endpoint of such reasoning
would be that no case can be meaningfully grouped with any other case, unless the facts and law in the
cases are identical. This study discriminates between various issues in patent cases, but otherwise its
conclusions are tempered by the imprecision of its categories.
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court over the same period of time minimizes the effect of personal,
institutional, or social factors that might affect frequencies of judicial
disagreement. Minimize, not eliminate: personal, institutional, or social
factors may vary across different fields of law for the same judge. I"
Nonetheless, to the extent that personal and institutional factors which
might provoke judicial disagreement remain constant across the fields of
law within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, then differences in dissent
frequency between cases in each field of law should reflect only the
degree to which the law is outcome-determinative in each field of law. If
Judges A, B, and C tend to vote in a bloc because they like each other,
then presumably their affection does not change depending upon the
subject matter presented by the case before the panel. Likewise,
institutional norms in favor of unanimity should not change depending
on the particular issues before the court.
The Federal Circuit's circumscribed jurisdiction may also make
judicial conflict at the Federal Circuit a more accurate proxy for legal
indeterminacy than conflict at other courts would be. It is commonly
assumed among judicial scholars, although not proven, that socially
controversial issues are more likely to provoke judicial disagreement."
The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction typically does not encompass
controversial issues such as criminal justice or personal liberties. Federal
Circuit judges thus would seem less likely than their colleagues on the
regional Circuits to be selected for the bench because they hold
particular ideologies. Notably, in Goldman's study of the effect of
judicial characteristics on outcomes in the United States Courts of
Appeals, the voting patterns least explainable by judicial background
variables were those on government fiscal issues, assertion of federal
jurisdiction, and private economic issues.' ° As defined by Goldman,"°
the categories of "government fiscal" and "private economic" seem to
correspond most closely with the caseload of the Federal Circuit, which is
io6. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 377, 390 (1996) (discussing of the
fifth condition of validity).
107. See Peterson, supra note 75, at 420-21, 424 (classifying hypothesis as "very indirectly
confirmed").
io8. See Goldman, supra note 77, at 5oo-o (reporting percentage of variation accounted for by
background variables for government fiscal, activism, and private economic categories as 7.7%, 12.4%,
and 12.8% respectively).
to9. Goldman classified as "government fiscal" cases those involving "tax, eminent domain, and
other fiscal cases," and as "private economic" those addressing insurance, antitrust, commercial,
bankruptcy, and stockholder issues. Id. at 492. See supra notes 78-79 for Goldman's other categories
and the percentage of variance explained by background variables. Of the remaining categories, the
only ones that might correspond to a significant portion of the Federal Circuit's caseload are labor
cases, given that the Federal Circuit hears appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board and the
Office of Personnel Management in federal employee claims. But these cases, dominated by statutes
and regulations applicable only to federal employees, would seem to share little with the labor-
management and NLRB cases tallied by Goldman from the regional Circuit Courts.
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dominated by various money claims against the United States, H0 and
economic disputes between private litigants in patent infringement cases.
Of all the federal Article III courts, we would expect decision-making at
the Federal Circuit to be least influenced by the political characteristics
of individual judges. Whether the observation that decision-making is
instead influenced by immeasurable characteristics of individual judges
comes any closer to revealing indeterminacy of the legal regime is a
theoretical question I do not seek to resolve. Nonetheless, to the extent
that conflict stemming from polarization of judges along political or
demographic axes is viewed as undesirable in a study of determinacy, a
study focusing on the Federal Circuit is least affected by such conflict.
III. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEASURING INDETERMINACY
A. A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE INCIDENCE OF DISSENT
From the foregoing examination of the extant literature on the
causes of judicial dissent, the causes of judicial dissent may be
summarized crudely but concisely: indeterminate issues of law contribute
to the expression of appellate dissent, but so do a range of other factors,
such as the personal characteristics and policy preferences of the judges,
the organization and procedures of the court, and cultural and
psychological factors rooted in the group dynamics of the court and its
decision-making process. If our interest is on legal indeterminacy alone,
we may construct a simple model of the process underlying the
expression of dissent in an appellate opinion. To do so, I separate
indeterminacy in the legal regime from all other factors that generate or
suppress dissent, and group the latter into an undifferentiated category I
term "structural variables ..... If legal indeterminacy and structural
variables both contribute to the likelihood that a judge will dissent in a
given case, then for a case containing issue x, the probability of the
opinion containing a dissent on issue x may be represented as:
P = Ix×S
where P. represents the probability of dissent on issue x, I. represents the
iio. Some examples are contract claims arising from the various contract appeals boards or the
Court of Federal Claims and veterans' benefits claims.
iii. The predominant component of Sc is likely the social acceptability of dissent at a particular
court. Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek built a multinominal logit model including separate
parameters for individual and court characteristics to explore the causes of dissent at the regional
Circuit Courts of Appeals for the period 196o to 1996. See HETrINGER, supra note 51. The court's
overall separate opinion rate was by far the factor contributing most significantly to the probability of
dissent in a given case. See id. at 66, 71, 67 (showing that the variable representing circuit norms had
greatest influence on probability of dissent or concurrence).
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legal indeterminacy of issue x, and S, represents the combined effects of
all structural variables at a specified court C. Rearrangement of this
equation yields a measure of indeterminacy for issue x:
Px
Sc
With a sufficient number of cases, the probability of dissent may be
estimated from the observed frequency of dissent. However, to
determine P. experimentally, we must measure the frequency at which
dissents appear only in cases in which issue x was considered by the
appellate court. Without such a restriction, the frequency of dissent
reflects both the frequency with which judges dissented on issue x, and
the frequency with which issue x appeared in the set of cases under study:
regardless of indeterminacy, rare issues would generate few dissents and
common issues would generate many. We may therefore compare dissent
frequencies between various legal issues only if we know the number of
cases in which those legal issues were in dispute.
Despite the requirement that the set of cases under study must be
restricted to those that presented issue x, issue x may be defined
narrowly as a single issue, or broadly as a collection of legal issues, so
long as we understand that our conclusions about the determinacy of
legal issues are only as specific as our definition of the issues."' Likewise,
court C may represent a single court or a group of courts, so long as the
boundaries of that definition are respected in subsequent calculations.
We may determine the absolute magnitude of Ix only by measuring
both the frequency of dissent Px, and the contribution of structural
variables SC.However, we lack any means to measure the contribution of
structural variables independently of dissent frequencies. Without
quantifying Sc, it is impossible to measure the absolute magnitude of the
indeterminacy parameter Ix.
It is nonetheless possible to measure the relative indeterminacy of
two different legal regimes as applied by a single court, provided we
make a simplifying assumption. The assumption is that Sc remains
constant"3 and independent of Ix. In other words, I assume that the
structural variables provoking or suppressing dissent do not change
depending on what issues the court is considering."4 If the contribution of
112. Because any higher-level definition of a "legal issue" allegedly common to more than one
case can readily be broken down into as many "sub-issues" as there are distinct fact patterns, the
boundaries of a "legal issue" are arbitrary.
113. The contribution of structural variables may change over time, particularly as the personnel of
a court shifts. It is therefore necessary to specify a time frame for each instance of S,
.
114. This assumption follows from the third condition of validity set forth in Part II. One might
imagine that some judges feel more strongly about certain issues than others and thus be more likely
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structural variables is the same between two issues x and y, then the
structural variables drop out of the comparison entirely:
lx Px×Sc Px
Iy Py X Sc Py
Accordingly, the relative indeterminacy of issues x and y at the same
court may be measured by comparing the frequency of dissents on issue x
in cases presenting issue x, and the frequency of dissents on issue y in
cases presenting issue y.
B. DATASET SELECTION
I focus in this study on judicial disagreement expressed in the form
of a dissenting opinion. To do so unquestionably underestimates the
absolute frequency of indeterminate cases. Judicial disagreement is also
expressed in concurring opinions, and a study of dissent alone will
exclude instances of judicial disagreement."5 Some researchers therefore
include concurring opinions in measurements of judicial disagreement. 6
There are, however, compelling reasons to concentrate on the frequency
of dissent alone. Only the dissenting opinion is an unambiguous
declaration that the dissenting judge disagreed with the outcome reached
by the majority. The concurring judge is not so easy to pin down: he may
agree with the outcome but disagree with the reasoning adopted by the
majority; he may agree that the legal regime dictates the outcome of the
case but wish to express dissatisfaction with that legal regime; he may be
engaged in preemptive exegesis of the opinion to influence future cases;
he may wish to criticize (or expand) dictum in the majority opinion. Only
the first of these possibilities represents a disagreement arising from the
indeterminacy of the legal regime, and disentangling them requires
to take the trouble to write a dissent depending on the issue. However, while the effects of such
variation might be significant at the level of the individual judge, they will be submerged when S, is
calculated as the aggregate structural variable for all the judges of the court. Furthermore, to the
extent the question has been examined in the literature, the data do not support issue-dependence of
an individual judge's tendency to dissent. Although not focused on the precise point discussed here,
Goldman's 1975 study of the United States Courts of Appeals found no correlation between voting
behavior, as measured by outcome on a series of political and economic issues selected to represent a
liberal-conservative axis, and tendency for a judge to dissent. See Goldman, supra note 77, at 494-95.
115. Outcome-focused studies find evidence of conflict even in unanimously decided cases, by
identifying judge-dependent discrepancies in outcomes from different panels of the same court. See
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Isaac Unah, The Incidence and Structure of Conflict in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, 23 L. & POL'y 69, 71 (2ooi); Green, supra note 54. It may be particularly tempting
for studies of intermediate courts to classify concurring opinions as disagreements because the
absolute incidence of both opinions is low; aggregation of dissents and concurrences increases the
likelihood that statistically significant conclusions may be drawn from the data.
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subjective judgments by the researcher about the degree to which the
concurring judge expresses agreement or disagreement with the majority
opinion. "7 Moreover, given that absolute frequencies of judicial
disagreement mean little,"8 systematic underestimation of the absolute
frequency of disagreement is acceptable. In a comparative study,
underestimation of the absolute frequency of disagreement due to the
omission of concurrences is problematic only if the relative expression of
disagreement in dissents and concurrences varies between the fields of
law (or time periods) under study. If the proportion of disagreement
expressed by dissents and concurrences remains constant, then changes
in the frequency of dissent accurately represents changes in the
frequency of disagreement. Evidence that the frequency of concurrence
in the Circuit Courts of Appeals correlates tightly with the frequency of
dissent "9 supports this proposition.
I exclude from all aspects of this study two categories of judgments:
judgments rendered by the court sitting en banc, and judgments in which
the court affirms the opinion of the lower tribunal without a written
opinion. Exclusion of the en banc cases follows from the principal aim of
this study: to assess the determinacy of the legal regimes governing
ordinary patent cases. As in other Circuit Courts of Appeals, the vast
majority of appealed cases at the Federal Circuit are resolved by three-
judge panels rather than the court sitting en banc. In both instances, the
court is nominally constrained by statute and by precedent of the
Supreme Court. When the court sits in panels, decision-making is further
constrained by precedents of the Federal Circuit, whether from earlier
panels or from the court sitting en banc. The constraint of precedent is
lifted when the court sits en banc, for the court is free to overrule its
prior precedent of either origin. As the volume of precedent has grown,
the constraint of Federal Circuit precedent is likely to be more significant
than the constraint of statute or Supreme Court precedent, given the
large number of factual or legal scenarios addressed by Federal Circuit
precedent. Aside from the fact that en banc cases are by definition
extraordinary (and rare), disagreement in en banc cases will not reflect
the determinacy of "ordinary" patent cases because the main constraint
governing ordinary patent cases has been lifted. Crudely speaking, judges
en banc are more likely to be disagreeing about what the law should be,
rather than about what it is. To be sure, disagreement en banc also arises
from indeterminacy of statute or Supreme Court precedent, and panel
opinions also confront questions of first impression. Nonetheless, the
fundamental differences in the legal regime and the decision-making
1 17. See Andrew Lynch, Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in
the High Court of Australia, 24 SYDNEY L. REV. 470, 487-91 (2002).
118. See supra Part II.C.
i 19. See Atkins & Green, supra note 44.
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process in en banc cases render them uninformative about the general
determinacy of patent cases.
I also exclude those cases in which the appellate court affirms the
judgment of the tribunal below without written opinion. This exclusion is
not justifiable on theoretical grounds: these appeals are likely to be the
ones in which the reviewing judges perceived the resolution of the case to
be so determined by the legal regime that no explication was necessary."'
While exploration of the universe of summarily affirmed cases is
possible, it is extremely resource-intensive."2 ' Nonetheless, as with most
other systematic sources of error in this study, distortions introduced by
excluding summary affirmances are problematic if one wishes to draw
conclusions from the absolute magnitude of judicial disagreement,'22 but
interfere with a comparative study only to the extent that the factors
(other than those connected with case determinacy)' 3 influencing the
court's decision to affirm without opinion vary over time, or between the
fields of law under study.
C. A NOTE ON STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
This study is concerned with the influence of law on judicial
behavior. Its data are confined to the records of judicial behavior,
judicial opinions, and its conclusions are limited to the judicial process.
Within those limitations, I generally collect data on the entire population
of cases meeting the time and subject criteria of interest. This does not
negate the necessity of statistical analysis. The statistical question of
interest is not whether observations from these cases are relevant to any
other population, but whether we can make inferences about the process
of judicial decision-making that produced the cases. The model of
judicial behavior described above posits that both legal and structural
120. Some smaller proportion no doubt represents the opposite: cases in which the resolution is so
difficult that judicial agreement can be achieved only by abandoning any attempt at a reasoned
opinion.
2I. See Moore, supra note 4, at 236. Ascertaining the originating tribunal would be possible by
manual review of all summary affirmances, since the judgment usually reports the originating tribunal.
However, determining what issues were present requires obtaining all the appellate briefs to
determine what issues were presented to the court by the litigants. See id. Even such painstaking
analysis may be incomplete if the issues actually considered by the appellate judges differ from those
perceived by the researcher upon perusing the appellate briefs.
122. See, e.g., id. at 235-36 (showing variation in district court reversal rates dependent on
exclusion of summary affirmances).
123. If the decision to affirm without opinion is influenced only by the degree of determinacy of
the case-e.g., the court affirms without opinion all cases over a particular threshold of determinacy-
then the opinions that remain will, to a first approximation, still reflect the levels of indeterminacy
characteristic of each field or time period in question. The numbers of opinions issuing from
determinate fields will of course be smaller than the numbers of opinions issuing from indeterminate
fields, but the frequency of disagreement in those opinions will still reflect determinacy. Note that the
validity of the preceding argument depends on the assumption that the distribution of indeterminacy is
similar in shape (though not in magnitude) among the sets of cases being compared.
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parameters contribute to a probability of disagreement each time an
appellate panel applies law to the circumstances of a case. Whether one
regards this as a purely stochastic process or a judicial sampling of an
underlying distribution of case facts, ' we would like to know how closely
the observed frequencies of judicial dissent estimate the underlying
probability of dissent, and whether observed differences between dissent
frequencies can be interpreted as differences in the underlying
probabilities. The statistical tools applicable to such questions are logistic
regression and the chi-squared test of distributions. Neither of these tools
requires the assumption common to parametric methods, that a sample
be normally distributed around a mean; so long as the sample is random
and sufficiently large, there are no constraints on distribution. By
convention, differences are deemed statistically significant at the 95%
level, and such significant differences are marked with an asterisk in
tables.
IV. DISSENT AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT AND ORIGINATING TRIBUNAL
To begin the characterization of the Federal Circuit, the overall
dissent frequency in all opinions of the Federal Circuit from 1983
through the first six months of 2005, excluding only en banc cases and
summary affirmances, was determined. A text-based search strategy,
followed by manual review, classified the published and unpublished
opinions reported in the LEXIS database according to originating
tribunal,'25 and the number of dissenting opinions6 The Federal Circuit
124. The choice of perspective determines how one interprets the meaning of legal indeterminacy
defined by the model. The definition employed in this study is operational, meaning that it measures
how often application of law to fact yields a determinate result. Whether indeterminate results are the
fault of the law or the facts is a matter of perspective.
125. The search strategy took advantage of the LEXIS "posture" and "history" fields to classify
opinions according to the originating tribunal, followed by the appropriate date restriction. The search
terms for each category were as follows. For the agency boards of contract appeals: POSTURE (board
/5 contract) or HISTORY (board /5 contract); for the Court of International Trade: POSTURE (court
/5 trade) or HISTORY (court /5 trade); for the Court of Federal Claims: POSTURE ("claims court"
or "federal claims") or HISTORY ("federal claims" or "claims court"); for the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims: POSTURE (court /5 veterans) or HISTORY (court /5 veterans); for all district
courts: POSTURE (court /5 district) or HISTORY (court /5 district); for the Department of Veterans
Affairs: POSTURE (department /5 veterans) or HISTORY (department /5 veterans); for the
International Trade Commission: POSTURE (trade /5 commission) or HISTORY (trade /5
commission); for the Merit Systems Protection Board: POSTURE (merit /5 board) or HISTORY
(merit /5 board); for the Senate Select Committee on Ethics: POSTURE (senate) or HISTORY
(senate); for the Patent and Trademark Office: POSTURE ((patent or trademark) /5 board) or
HISTORY ((patent or trademark) /5 board). District court cases arising under the Little Tucker Act
(those provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (20oo) specified by 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2)) (2000) were identified
by searching for ("little tucker" or (28 /5 "1346") or (28 /5 "1295(a)(2)") in the case body. The set of
cases retrieved was further screened manually to eliminate spurious retrievals and instances of
duplicates where the databases contain both the opinion and a document reporting the judgment. The
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reviews cases originating from ten distinct sets of tribunals.'27 The
number of panel opinions and dissents in cases originating from each
tribunal, totaling 16,174 and 683 respectively, is shown in Table I. The
corresponding frequencies of dissent are shown in Table II.
TABLE I: CASES AND DISSENTS AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 1983-2oo5 12
8
YEAR BCA CT CFC CAVC DISTRICT DVA ITC MSPB SENATE Pro
193 1 6I COURTS I Comm.[C DIC O D C D CID C D CID CIDICID IDICIO
1983 31 16 1 65 6 o 0 46 4 0 0 4 0 156 4 0 0 30 5
1984 40 2 29 3 92 4 0 0 112 10 0 0 3 0 325 5 0 0 23 2
1985 26 1 22 0 109 I 0 0 112 10 0 0 9 1 472 2 0 0 31 2
1986 32 0 24 2 81 2 0 0 129 6 o 0 10 0 487 6 0 0 51 1
1987 36 1 23 o 66 6 o o I21i 10 0 0 6 0 265 4 o o 68 3
I988 50 5 33 1 83 6 o o 126 9 0 0 9 0 194 6 o 0 73 5
1989 56 I 32 3 54 2 0 0 130 7 0 0 4 0 1217 I 0 o 66 5
1990 53 4 32 1 84 6 1 0 142 2 0 0 4 0 252 2 o o 82 3
1991 43 I 23 2 101 6 23 0 123 4 2 0 4 0 283 2 0 0 78 2
1992 40 2 19 1 109 i 24 0 140 5 0 0 2 0 372 2 0 0 77 3
1993 53 3 26 0 141 10 20 o 161 9 o 0 3 0 353 2 0 0 79 5
1994 56 3 34 1 112 7 21 2 153 9 0 0 2 0 326 2 1 0 43 2
1995 40 2 40 2 119 9 9 1 173 21 I 0 4 0 41H 8 2 0 57 4
1996 29 2 36 5 109 4 14 o 196 16 o o 6 1 392 4 1 0 38 3
1997 6I 1 44 5 101 7 19 0 217 9 0 0 9 0 249 4 0 0 54 4
1998 44 0 1 49 4 112 7 41 2 208 14 1 0 4 0 225 4 0 0 24 1
1999 29 I 42 3 113 6 6o 2 210 16 1 o 4 0 262 3 1 0 43 3
2000 24 0 23 4 104 5 90 2 222 10 3 0 I 0 288 3 0 0 35 1
2001 24 0 30 0 96 7 71 3 254 19 2 0 7 0 279 6 0 0 49 2
2002 34 4 28 6 16 7 43 2 222 22 4 0 I 0 222 7 0 0 50 4
2003 26 I 39 6 114 6 52 2 223 25 5 1 2 1 238 7 0 0 43 4
2004 29 3 44 6 109 11 46 2 211 28 0 o 6 0 226 i 0 0 42 2
JAN-JUN 8 0 22 1 59 2 28 3 140 12 0 0 1 0 138 8 0 0 21 0
TOTAL 71864[ 4° i57 2241I2815621 2ib7712771 19[ 610s3632193 1 5 1 o 157 66
number of en banc cases in each time period was determined by identifying cases in which more than
three judges heard the appeal, and subtracting these numbers from the search results.
126. Dissents were identified by the search term "(dissent! /io judge)".
127. This study follows the classification used by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in its
statistical reports. Under this classification, the Federal Circuit reviews cases originating at the Boards
of Contract Appeals (BCA), the Court of International Trade (CIT), the Court of Federal Claims
(CFC), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), the district courts, the Department of
Veterans Affairs (DVA), the International Trade Commission (ITC), the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB), and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). A few federal employee decisions
originate directly from the Office of Personnel Management, which are here consolidated with cases
originating from the MSPB. The court also reviews a very small number of determinations involving
Congressional employees originating at the Senate Select Committee on Ethics or, since 1995, the
Office of Compliance (Senate Comm.). 28 U.S.C. § 1295 vests the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction
over a few miscellaneous appeals, of which there have been few or none since the court's inception.
128. "C" represents cases, and "D" represents dissents.
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TABLE II: DISSENT FREQUENCY AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 1983-2005
YEAR BCA CIT CFC CAVC DISTICT DVA ITC MSPB SENATECOURTS COMM.
1983 9.68% 6.25% 9.23% N/C 8.70% N/C 0.00% 2.56% N/C 16.67%
1984 5.00% 10.34% 4.35% N/C 8.93% N/C 0.00% 1.54% N/C 8.70%
1985 3.85% 0.00% 0.92% N/C 8.93% N/C 11.I1% 0.42% N/C 6.45%
1986 0.00% 8.33% 2.47% N/C 4.65% N/C 0.00% 1.23% N/C 1.96%
1987 2.78% 0.00% 9.09% N/C 8.26% N/C 0.00% 1.51% N/C 4.41%
1988 10.OO% 3.03% 7.23% N/C 7.14% N/C 0.00% 3.09% N/C 6.85%
1989 1.79% 9.38% 3.70% N/C 5.38% N/C 0.00% 0.46% N/C 7.58%
1990 7.55% 3.13% 7.14% 0.00% 1.41% N/C 0.o% 0.79% N/C 3.66%
1991 2.33% 8.70% 5.94% 0.00% 3.25% 0.00% 0.00% 0.71% N/C 2.56%
1992 5.00% 5.26% 0.92% 0.00% 3.57% N/C 0.00% 0.54% N/C 3.90%
1993 5.66% 0.00% 7.09% 0.00% 5.59% N/C 0.00% 0.57% N/C 6.33%
1994 5.36% 2.94% 6.25% 9.52% 5.88% N/C 0.00% o.6I% 0.00% 4.65%
1995 5.00% 5.00% 7.56% I1.1I% 12.14% 0.00% 0.00% 1.95% 0.00% 7.02%
1996 6.90% 13.89% 3.67% o.oo% 8.16% N/C I6.67% 1.02% 0.00% 7.89%
1997 1.64% 11.36% 6.93% 0.00% 4-15% N/C 0.00% r.6I% N/C 7.41%
1998 0.00% 8.I6% 6.25% 4.88% 6.73% 0.00% 0.00% 1.78% N/C 4.17%
1999 3.45% 7.14% 5-31% 3.33% 7.62% 0.00% 0.00% 1.15% 0.00% 6.98%
2000 0.00% 17.39% 4.81% 2.22% 4.50% 0.00% 0.00% 1.04% N/C 2.86%
2001 0.00% o.o0% 7.29% 4.23% 7.48% 0.00% 0.00% 2.15% N/C 4.08%
2002 11.76% 21.43% 6.03% 4.65% 9.91% 0.00% 0.00% 3.15% N/C 8.oo%
2003 3.85% 15.38% 5.26% 3.85% 11.21% 20.00% 50.00% 2.94% N/C 9.30%
2004 10.34% 13.64% 10-09% 4.35% 13.27% N/C 0.00% o.44% N/C 4.76%
PAN-JUN 2005 0.00% 4-55% 3.39% 10.71% 8.57% N/C 0.00% 5.80% N/C 0.00%
TOTAL F4.63% 8.03% ] 5.69% [ 3"74% J7-35% 5.26% 1 2.86% ] 1.40% [ 0.00% [ 5.70%
Table III reports selected statistics derived from the tribunal dissent
frequencies: the dissent frequencies for all Federal Circuit opinions, the
dissent frequencies for all Federal Circuit opinions excepting those
originating from the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the dissent
frequencies for opinions originating from the district courts excepting
those in which the district court's jurisdiction was based on a monetary
claim against the United States under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) (2000). Excluding cases brought under the Little Tucker Act
restricts the district court cases almost entirely to patent matters,
including appeals in civil actions filed to challenge a decision of the
Patent and Trademark Office on patentability, priority, or term
adjustment.'29
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (2ooo) (granting Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals in certain civil actions against the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office under Title
35).
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TABLE III: SUMMARY DISSENT FREQUENCIES, 1983-2005
YEAR LL ALL CASES No DISTRICT COURT
MSPB PATENT CASES
I983 6.63% 9.95% 8.89%
1984 4.19% 7.09% 9.17%
1985 2.o6% 4.59% 8.33%
1986 1.75% 2.54% 2.56%
1987 4.00% 6.13% 8.11%
1988 5.56% 6.87% 6.90%
1989 3.41% 5.29% 5.47%
1990 2.63% 3.80% 0.72%
1991 2.37% 3.56% 2.52%
1992 i.8o% 2.97% 3.76%
1993 3.50% 5.67% 5.84%
1994 3.36% 5.49% 5.33%
1995 5.39% 8.58% 11.70%
1996 4.16% 7.06% 7.81%
1997 3.98% 5.15% 4.15%
1998 4.53% 5.81% 6.76%
1999 4.44% 6.I6% 7.62%
2000 3.J8% 4.41% 4.57%
2001 4.48% 5.71% 7.32%
2002 7.27% 9.13% 10.14%
2003 7.14% 9.13% 11.21%
2004 7.07% 10.19% 12.20%
2005 6.31% 6.57% 8.89%
(JAN-JUN) _______ ______________
TOTAL 4.20% [ 6.I9% 7.14%
Excluding the miniscule number of Congressional employee cases,
dissent frequencies from the Federal Circuit's inception through mid-
2005 ranged from a low of 1.40% for cases originating at the Merit
Systems Protection Board, to a high of 8.03% for cases originating at the
Court of International Trade. The total dissent frequency for all opinions
rendered by the Federal Circuit is 4.20%, as shown in Table III. The
reader should bear in mind that this statistic is weighted by the number
of cases resolved by the Circuit, as shown in Table I. For example, over
one-third of the Federal Circuit's cases are appeals on Federal employee
matters originating from the Merit Systems Protection Board. Such
appeals, usually resolved without oral argument, generate little
disagreement. Excluding these cases from the analysis would raise the
Federal Circuit's cumulative dissent frequency to 6.19%.
The originating tribunal statistics obscure a great deal of complexity,
because classification by originating tribunal is a broad measure. These
statistics aggregate all the disparate legal issues that may arise in cases
originating from a given tribunal. We may therefore draw conclusions
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only about the relative indeterminacy of the entire body of law governing
such cases rather than the indeterminacy of particular legal issues.
Moreover, because the distribution of legal issues among the cases
remains unknown, the dissent frequencies are weighted according to the
frequency with which particular issues arise. Finally, each dissent
frequency reflects not only the indeterminacy of the substantive law
governing cases from each tribunal, but also contributions from
procedural and other matters at both the originating tribunal and the
Federal Circuit. 3
Within these limitations, we may represent the dissent frequencies of
Table II as relative indeterminacy ratios, I!I,, by choosing one of the
legal regimes as the comparator I,. The choice of comparator is arbitrary;
Table IV reports the indeterminacy ratios using for I, either the Federal
Circuit's total aggregate dissent frequency, or the dissent frequency in
patent cases from the district courts.
TABLE IV: FEDERAL CIRCUIT INDETERMINACY RATIOS, 1983-2005
ORIGINATING NORMALIZED NORMALIZED TO
DISTRICT COURT PATENT
TRIBUNAL TO ALL CASESCAE CASES
BCA i.1O o.65
CIT 1.91 1.12
CFC 1.35 o.8o
CAVC 0.89 0.52
DISTRICT
COURTS 1.75 1.03
DISTRICT COURT
PATENT 1.70 (1.00)
DVA 1.25 0.74
ITC o.68 0.40
MSPB 0.33 0.20
PTO 1.36 0.80
ALL CASES (1.OO) 0.59
ALL CASES No
MSPB 1.47 0.87
130. For example, these statistics include opinions and dissents arising from motion practice before
the Federal Circuit.
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The indeterminacy ratios vary over an approximately six-fold range,
from the low of MSPB cases to the high of the CIT cases, or
approximately four-fold if we exclude the MSPB cases and define the
ITC cases at the bottom of the range. Based on the indeterminacy ratios,
the indeterminacy of patent infringement actions appears approximately
equal to that of cases appealed from the Court of International Trade;
slightly greater than that of appeals originating from the Patent and
Trademark Office, Court of Federal Claims, and Department of
Veterans Affairs; somewhat greater than appeals from the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the International Trade Commission;
and notably greater than appeals from the Merit System Protection
Board.
A basic statistical analysis (the chi-squared test) of the distribution
of dissent frequencies showed that the distribution of dissents was highly
non-random, both over time'3' and between the originating tribunals.'32
We may therefore conclude confidently that the frequency of dissent in
Federal Circuit opinions depends on the originating tribunal, and the
year in which the court decided the appeal. However, this basic test tells
us only that the overall distribution of dissents differs from that expected
by chance; it does not tell us which tribunal or which years are
responsible for that difference.
To assess the contribution of tribunal and year to the observed
dissent frequencies, more complex statistical techniques are required.
Logistic regression (an analogue of linear regression) may be used to
model processes in which several underlying variables contribute to the
probability of a dichotomous outcome,' and has been frequently
employed to analyze the influence of case or judge characteristics on the
probability of dissent.'34 I modeled dissent at the Federal Circuit as a
process in which the probability of dissent is influenced by two
independent factors: a time-independent parameter representing the
originating tribunal, and a time-dependent parameter which takes on the
value of each year of this study.'35 Omitted from the analysis are opinions
originating from the Department of Veterans Affairs, the International
Trade Commission, and the Senate Select Committee, on account of the
small number of cases originating from these tribunals.
A model incorporating tribunal and year as contributors to the
131. Pearson's moment 1o7.o,p < 0.0001.
132. Pearson's moment 263.7,p <0.000I.
133. I.e., where the outcome is described as a binary choice (dissent/unanimous; alive/dead, etc.)
rather than a continuous measurement (such as height or weight).
134. See, e.g., HEqrINGER, ET AL., supra note 5 1, at 83-84; Unah, supra note 1 16, at 85-86.
135. Both parameters are nominal, meaning that there is no order or relationship between values
of each parameter. "2004" is simply a category of cases and has no particular relationship with "2003"
or "2005" or any other year.
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probability of dissent fit the data well, was superior in fit to a model
based on tribunal alone or year alone, and the effect of both tribunal and
year was significant in the model.'"' The estimates for each parameter in
the model are shown in Table V, along with the p-value for the Wald chi-
squared statistic for each parameter.
136. For the model incorporating both tribunal and year, the whole-model chi-squared value was
357.0 (p <o.oooi), and the chi-squared lack of fit test yielded p = 0.76. Models including tribunal alone
or year alone yielded lack-of-fit chi squared values with p = 0.48 and 0.45, respectively. The increase in
significance level for the single-factor models indicates that the goodness of fit was superior for the
two-factor model. For the two-factor model, the chi-squared effect test statistics for tribunal and year
were 247.1 (p < o.oooi) and 80.6 (p < o.oooi) respectively. In a model including a second-order term
representing the interaction of tribunal and year, the effect of the second-order term on the model was
not significant (p = 0.41).
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TABLE V: Two-VARIABLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL OF FEDERAL
CIRCUIT DISSENT FREQUENCIES
p-VALUE (WALD CH1-
TERM PARAMETER ESTIMATE SQUARED)
TRIBUNAL[BCA] 0.03 0.8574
TRIBUNAL[CAVC] -0.29 0.1249
TRIBUNAL[CFC] 0.21 0.0299*
TRIBUNAL[CIT] 0-55 < 0.0001 *
TRIBUNAL[DCT PATENT] 0-43 < 0.000I*
TRIBUNAL[MSPB] -I.18 <O.OOOI*
TRIBUNAL[PTO] 0.26 0.0352*
YEAR[1983] 0.62 0.0079*
YEAR[1984] o.i8 0.3855
YEAR[19851 -0.50 0.0346*
YEAR[1986] -o.6o 0.01 13*
YEAR[1987] o.o6 0.7941
YEAR[1988] 0.28 0.1359
YEAR[1989] -0.21 0.3535
YEAR[1990] -0-47 0.0337*
YEAR[199I] -0.51 0.0244*
YEAR[1992] -0.73 0.0017*
YEAR[1993] -0.II 0.5447
YEAR[1994] -0-15 0.4526
YEAR[1995] 0-39 0.0143*
YEAR[1996] o.o8 0.6707
YEAR[1997] -0.10 0.5710
YEAR[1998] 0.02 0.8960
YEAR[1999] 0.05 0.7966
YEAR[2000] -0.26 o.1823
YEAR[2001] o.o6 0.7082
YEAR[2002] 0.53 0.0006*
YEAR[2003] 0.48 0.0019*
YEAR[2004] 0.51 0.0012*
YEAR[2005] 0.38 0.0696
The precise interpretation of parameter estimates from logistic
regressions is complex. For our purposes, it suffices to note that (i) the
parameter estimate is related logarithmically to the change in outcome
odds, and (2) the change in odds is relative to the mean dissent frequency
for all observations, in this case the overall dissent frequency of 4.21%
for the tribunals modeled. A positive parameter estimate indicates that
this parameter is associated with increased odds of dissent relative to the
mean, and a negative parameter is associated with decreased odds of
dissent relative to the mean. Statistically significant parameters indicate
that it is unlikely that the observed frequencies are a result of chance
rather than an effect of the parameter on the probability of dissent.
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The regression model yielded positive and significant parameters for
the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, the
district courts, and the Patent and Trademark Office, indicating that
origin of a case from these tribunals significantly increases the
probability of dissent relative to the mean. In contrast, the negative and
significant parameter associated with appeals originating from the Merit
Systems Protection Board demonstrates that such origin significantly
decreases the likelihood of dissent relative to the mean.
To compare specifically the likelihood of dissent in patent cases with
other cases, we may perform pairwise contrast tests of the logistic
regression model. These tests predict according to the regression model
the change in the odds of dissent if we change the originating tribunal
from one category to another. Table VI compares the odds of dissent if
the case is a patent case originating from the district courts, with the odds
of dissent if the case originated from each of the other tribunals, and
reports the significance of these odds ratios.
TABLE VI: RATIOS OF DISSENT ODDS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES
TO DISSENT ODDS IN OTHER CASES, 1983-2005
I CA ICAvc I CFC T I MSPB
[AIRWISLIT 0.40 0.72 0.22 -0.12 0.17 1.61
ODDS RAIO 1.50 2.06 1.25 0.89 1.18 5.02
P-VALUE o.0169* 0.0007* 0.0440* 0.4336 0.2366 <O.00I*
The odds ratio shows the logistic model's prediction for the change
in odds if the case changes from the indicated tribunal to a patent case
from the district courts. Thus, the model predicts that the odds of dissent
are 5.02 times greater in a patent case than in a MSPB cases, 2.06 times
greater in a patent case than in a CAVC case, etc. The odds ratios
predicted by logistic regression correspond closely with those determined
simply from the ratios of the observed dissent frequencies,'37 reflecting
the close fit of the model to the observed data. More usefully, the
significance levels associated with each ratio permit us to draw firm
conclusions about the indeterminacy of patent cases compared to the
indeterminacy of other cases resolved by the Federal Circuit. Appeals of
patent infringement actions are significantly more indeterminate than
those originating from the Boards of Contract Appeals, the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, the Court of Federal Claims, or the Merit
137. The reciprocal of the odds ratios are: o.67 (BCA); 0.49 (CAVC); o.8o (CFC); 1.13 (CIT); 0.8 5
(PTO); 0.20 (MSPB). These correspond closely to the tribunal dissent frequencies normalized to the
district court dissent frequency shown in Table IV.
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Systems Protection Board. We cannot state whether patent infringement
cases differ in indeterminacy from those originating from the Court of
International Trade or the Patent and Trademark Office.
Returning to the parameters derived from the logistic regression
model, Table V shows that the years 1983, 1995, and 2002-2004, and
(marginally) 2005 were associated with probabilities of dissent increased
relative to the mean, while 1985-1986 and 1990-1992 were associated
with decreased probabilities of dissent. This analysis cannot resolve
whether the time-dependent changes in the probability of dissent
resulted from changes in the indeterminacy of cases decided by the
Federal Circuit, or changes in the structural variables that suppress or
provoke dissent at the court. Dissent frequencies rose across several
categories of cases commencing in 2002, as shown in Table II. This
coordinated increase might indicate that Circuit-wide norms restraining
the expression of dissent began to deteriorate in 2002, i.e. that the
Federal Circuit's structural parameter S, began to increase at that time.
But it is also possible that the increase in dissent reflects not changes in
structural parameters but coincident increases in indeterminacy across
several categories of cases.
B. REVERSAL AND DISSENT
Studies of the Circuit Courts of Appeals report a strong association
between reversal of the district court and dissent on the appellate
court."" This association has been ascribed to the effect of legal
indeterminacy, because both trial and appellate judges are observers of
the case who may disagree when legal principles only weakly constrain
outcomes.'39 Although this study did not correlate the incidence of
dissent with individual reversals or affirmances, we may compare the
rates of Federal Circuit dissent and Federal Circuit reversal between
tribunals to gauge the overall correlation between reversal and dissent. I
derived tribunal reversal rates, for a period nearly coincident with this
study, from data compiled by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.'4" Table VII shows the comparative reversal and dissent
138. HETrlNGER ET AL., supra note 51, at 66-71; RICHARDSON & VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL
COURTS 135-36 (1970).
139. HETrINGER ET AL., supra note 5I, at 59.
140. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts, Annual
Reports of the Director, http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (last visited Apr. i, 2007)
(follow Annual Reports hyperlinks). The Administrative Office reports in Table B-8 of each report
the number of appeals terminated by judges (versus by staff) and the percentage of cases reversed by
tribunal for each fiscal year. Id. The number of cases for each tribunal reversed for each year was
derived from the number of the appeals and the reversal rate, and summed from fiscal year 1997 to
fiscal year 2005 to determine the reversal rate over that period. Because the statistics are reported by
fiscal year, the dataset defined by the Administrative Office reports covers an additional three months
both prior and following the portion of this study used for comparison (October 1, I996 to December
31, 1996 and July 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005). It seems unlikely that inclusion of this period would
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proportions, and the number of dissents per reversal, for the tribunals
having significant numbers of dissents and reversals,'"' as well as the total
for all tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit.
TABLE VII: COMPARATIVE REVERSAL AND DISSENT RATES BY
TRIBUNAL, 1997-2005
BCA CIT CFC CAVC DISTRITR MSPB PTO ALL
______ i ____ __  _____I______jCOURTS I TRIBUNALS
REVERSALS
FYI 9 97- 13.9% 22.1% 20.8% 14.1% 17.2% 5.8% 11.4% 13.8%
FY2005
1997-2OO 3.6% I0.9% 6.3% 4.0% 8.1% 2.0% 5.8% 5-3%
DRSSENS: 0.26 0.49 0.30 0.28 0.47 0.35 0.51 0.39REVERSALSI
Because the dataset of this study and the dataset maintained by the
Administrative Office were not compiled with identical inclusion criteria,
the absolute value of the ratio of dissents to reversals for a particular
tribunal has little meaning.' Comparisons between tribunals are
meaningful, because the methodology of both datasets is constant over
the set of tribunals. A relatively low ratio of dissents to reversals marks
categories of cases that the appellate court considered "easy," in the
sense that they did not provoke disagreement within the court, but where
the originating tribunal more frequently reached the wrong conclusion
(at least according to the Federal Circuit). Higher ratios mark regimes in
which issues provoking disagreement between the Federal Circuit and
the originating tribunal also provoked disagreement within the appellate
court.
yield reversal rates significantly different from those computed for January , 1997 to June 30, 2005.
141. The standard errors computed for each proportion and ratio in Table VII were:
B C 1 1 C DISTRICT ALL
BCA CIT CFC CAVC COURTS MSPB J PTO TRIBUNALS
DISSENTS 1.11% 1.74% o.80o%I 0.92% 0.63% o.31% 1.23% 0.28%
REVERSALS 1.92% i.8o% o.% I.I3% 0 69% o.44% 1.48% 0.36%
RATnO 0.09 0.09 0.04 0 . .04 o.o6 0.13 0.02
Errors of the reversal and dissent proportions are reported as percentages because Table VII reports
those proportions as percentages; they do not represent error as a percentage of the values reported in
Table VII. These errors are not corrected for the correlation between dissent and reversal, which
would reduce the magnitude of the standard errors.
142. Nonetheless, the ratio across all tribunals from 1997-2005, 0.39, is similar to that derived from
the database of all the cases of the regional Circuit Courts of Appeals described in SONGER ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 1O5. For 1970-1988, the last time period of the database, Songer et al. report a dissent
rate of 9.43%, and a reversal rate of 30.83%. Id. The ratio computed from these rates is 0.31.
Discrepancies between the Songer dataset (which was limited to reported decisions) and the datasets
of this study, and of the Administrative Office, counsel against drawing conclusions from this
comparison.
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Legal indeterminacy ought to increase both disagreement between
the originating tribunal and the Federal Circuit, and between the judges
of the Federal Circuit. Therefore, variations in indeterminacy between
each legal regime represented in Table VII will increase or decrease the
percentage of reversals and dissents, but should not affect the ratio of
dissents to reversals. If the effect of legal indeterminacy on dissents and
reversals is constant within each regime, we would expect more
disagreement between the originating tribunal and the appellate panel
either where the policy preferences of the appellate judges differ from
those of the originating tribunal, or where the two bodies differ in their
ability to discern the "correct" outcome of the case. We would thus
expect a high ratio of dissents to reversals where the viewpoint or
capability of the originating tribunal approaches that of the Federal
Circuit, and low ratios where the viewpoint or capability of the
originating tribunal diverges from that of the Federal Circuit.
Table VII shows that rates of reversal and dissent are well-
correlated.'43 Although the rates of reversal and dissent vary over a four-
to five-fold range, with a low at the Merit Systems Protection Board and
a high at the Court of International Trade, the ratio of dissent to reversal
remains relatively constant, varying over only a two-fold range. This
correlation suggests that the originating and appellate tribunals have
broadly similar policy preferences and competencies, and variation in
dissent rates and reversal rates between tribunals tracks variations in the
indeterminacy of the law.
The high correlation between reversal and dissents means that the
differences in the dissent to reversal ratio between tribunals are not
especially significant. Moreover, over a short time interval, the ratio for
any one tribunal will be significantly depressed if the Federal Circuit
announces a new precedent which triggers many reversals in its
immediate wake. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the district courts
score high, indicating a relatively good correspondence between
preferences or capabilities of the district courts and those of the Federal
Circuit. The district courts' ratio is exceeded, marginally, by the Patent
and Trademark Office and the Court of International Trade, but is
otherwise higher than the other specialized tribunals reviewed by the
Federal Circuit. Statistical comparison of the district courts' dissent:
reversal ratio to those of the other tribunals showed that the ratio
computed for the district courts is significantly higher than that
computed for the BCA, CFC, CAVC and (marginally) the MSPB, but
not significantly different from the other tribunals.'
143. Pearson's r= o.82;p < 0.05.
144. A z-score for the difference in ratios between the district courts and each other tribunal was
computed from the standard errors of the ratios. The z-scores were 2.23* (BCA), -0.20 (CFC), 2.95*
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V. INDETERMINACY IN PATENT LITIGATION
A. INDETERMINACY OF PATENT CASES IN GENERAL
Classifying cases by originating tribunal facilitates comparison
between regimes, but it obscures more than might be supposed. The
opinions contain not only opinions resolving substantive or procedural
issues in an appeal, but also miscellaneous orders and opinions related to
Federal Circuit appellate practice and jurisdiction, as well as petitions for
rehearing or the issuance of writs. If we are interested in the
indeterminacy of the underlying body of law governing case outcomes,
we must restrict our consideration to those opinions addressing
outcomes. To do so, we must obtain a dataset consisting only of patent
cases at the Federal Circuit originating in the district courts. This
category is comprised almost entirely of actions for patent infringement,
or for declaratory judgment of noninfringement.'45 To collect the
complete set of opinions resolving patent cases from the district courts, I
began with an initial dataset comprising all published and unpublished
decisions of the Federal Circuit for the period extending from January I,
1983, to June 30, 2005. En banc cases and summary affirmances were
excluded. To more specifically assess the degree to which the legal
regime constrains decision-making in patent cases, opinions devoted
solely to petitions were also excluded from the dataset. 46 Like other
federal appellate courts,47 the Federal Circuit operates at its own
discretion in granting petitions,' 4 and these opinions do not provide an
opportunity to assess the constraining effect of statute or precedent.
To accurately determine the number of appeals in patent actions
originating in the district courts,4 9 I employed an iterative textual screen
of the LEXIS Federal Circuit databases, filtering the results with various
search parameters and manually reviewing the included and excluded
(CFC), 2.33* (CAVC), r.68 (MSPB) and -0.30 (PTO). The difference between the district court ratio
and the MSPB ratio became significant if the standard errors of the ratios was corrected for the
correlation between dissents and reversals.
145. A very small number of cases are appeals from litigants challenging a decision of the Patent
and Trademark Office by means of a civil action under 35 U.S.C §§ 145, 146, or I54(b)(4)(A) (200o).
146. This category includes primarily petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc, with a
small number of petitions for a writ of mandamus and a smaller number of miscellaneous petitions. It
includes the relatively small number of issued opinions that address motions made before the Federal
Circuit. Some of these opinions address procedural issues (e.g., motions to dismiss an appeal for lack
of a final judgment), while others deal with matters of Federal Circuit practice (e.g., motions to strike a
portion of an opponent's brief for failure to comply with Federal Circuit rules).
147. See, e.g., In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 12t F.3d 163, 163 (5th Cir. 1997).
148. In re United States, 463 F-3d 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (writ of mandamus).
149. Included in this category are cases originating in a district court but arriving again at the
Federal Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court. Excluded are district court cases that do not
represent patent infringement actions, such as money claims against the United States brought under
the Little Tucker Act.
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cases to correct for textual anomalies and database encoding errors.'5 °
The final dataset comprised 2,364 opinions resolving patent infringement
appeals for the period extending from 1983 through the first six months
of 2005. I then employed a similar strategy to recover all opinions in the
dataset containing a dissenting opinion,'5 ' yielding a final total of 250
panel dissents. The incidence of dissent in all appeals of patent
infringement actions originating in the district courts and resolved by
three-judge panels of the Federal Circuit is shown in Table VIII.
150. I began by searching the LEXIS CAFC database with the search terms "POSTURE (court /5
district) or HISTORY (court /5 district)" and appropriate date restrictions to define a preliminary of
district court cases (4,084 opinions for all years). I then filtered this set with the search term "patent"
to exclude cases definitively having no connection to patent law (2,744 opinions). From this set, I
defined a preliminary subsets of opinions resolving patent cases by excluding petitions
("not(DISPOSITION(petition) or DISPOSITION(rehearing))"; 2,587 opinions) and further requiring
the word "patent" in the LEXIS CORE-TERM field ("core-terms(patent)"; 2,261 opinions). From
this set I subtracted en banc cases according to the date-specific four-judge exclusion method
described in Part IV (2,240 opinions). I then, by manual review of the included and excluded opinions
at each filtering step, corrected this dataset for the following errors and ambiguities in the LEXIS
fields: opinions with "petition" or "rehearing" in the DISPOSITION field not actually addressing
petitions; opinions lacking "petition" or "rehearing" in the DISPOSITION field but solely addressing
a petition; patent infringement appeals lacking the word "patent" in the CORE-TERMS field, and
appeals originating from a district court but failing the POSTURE or HISTORY criteria described
above. The great majority of such anomalies were opinions in patent appeals where the LEXIS
CORE-TERMS field failed to include the word "patent."
151. Because of inconsistencies in the LEXIS databases, I defined separate, overlapping subsets of
dissenting opinions by limiting the dataset to opinions with the word root "dissent" in the JUDGES
field ("JUDGES("dissent!")), and by limiting the dataset to opinions with any judge who has served
on the Federal Circuit in the DISSENTBY field. I then corrected the small number of instances where
dissenting opinions were not coded in either the JUDGES or DISSENTBY field, by manually
reviewing each case that failed the above criteria but nonetheless contained the word root "dissent" in
the opinion text ("dissent!").
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TABLE VIII: DISSENT FREQUENCIES IN
ACTIONS, 1983-2005
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
APPEALS OF PATENT DISSENTS DISSENT FREQUENCY
YEAR ~ INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS
1983 37 4 IO.81%
1984 89 9 10.II%
1985 65 9 13.85%
1986 68 3 4.41%
1987 64 8 12.50%
1988 62 9 14.52%
1989 55 7 12.73%
1990 68 1 1.47% *
1991 80 3 3'75% *
1992 75 5 6.67%
1993 84 9 10.71%
1994 79 6 7.59%
1995 103 19 18.45% *
1996 128 14 10.94%
1997 138 8 5.8o%
1998 133 12 9.02%
1999 146 14 9.59%
2000 142 10 7.04%
2001 177 17 9.6o%
2002 155 20 12.90%
2003 163 25 15.34% *
2004 151 28 18.54% *
2005 (JAN-JUN) 101 10 9.90%
TOTAL E _ 2363 I 250 io.58%
Logistic regression analysis'52, as described above for the analysis of
tribunal data, but with a single independent variable representing year,
suggested that the decreased dissent frequencies observed in 199o and
1991, and the increased dissent frequencies observed in 1995, 2003 and
2004, were statistically significant differences from the mean dissent
frequency. 53 These minima and maxima are suggestive of fluctuations in
the indeterminacy of the substantive legal regime governing patent cases,
but as with the comparison of tribunal dissent frequencies, this analysis
cannot resolve fluctuations in legal indeterminacy from fluctuations in
Circuit-wide norms of dissent.
The dissent frequencies reported in Table V provide a more
accurate measure of the incidence of dissent in patent cases than do the
statistics of Tables I to IV, because the filtration process limits the
dataset to opinions actually resolving disputed patent cases. These
statistics are nonetheless still crude: they reflect a weighted aggregate of
I52. Whole model difference chi-squared 47.13, p = 0.0014; lack-of-fit chi square 2363.00, p =
0.3651.
153. Parameter estimates and associated significance levels were for 1990: -1.92, p =0.0045; 1992:
-0.95,p =-0.5; 1995: o.8o,p = 0.0039; 2003: .58,p = 0.0146; 2004: o.8 1,p = 0.0005.
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all substantive, procedural, and non-patent issues arising in patent
litigation, and we lack an appropriate comparator to assess the relative
indeterminacy of the patent litigation regime to another legal regime. To
overcome these limitations, we must disaggregate the issues presented in
patent litigation and determine to what extent the legal regime constrains
their decision.
B. INDETERMINACY OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND OTHER PATENT ISSUES
To accurately assess the indeterminacy of the legal issues governing
patent appeals, we must define "legal issue" at a level below that of the
individual case. Following the approach of Chu,'54 the following five
groupings of legal issues that appear in patent infringement cases were
defined: claim construction, infringement, invalidity,'55  inequitable
conduct, and all other issues. The last category, "other," is a catch-all
category including not only patent issues other than the listed categories,
but also issues of procedure and jurisdiction, as well as any non-patent
substantive issue appearing in a patent case."6
The relative indeterminacy of particular patent law issues in the
interval between Cybor and Phillips was assessed by examining every
reported and unreported opinion of the Federal Circuit, in patent
appeals originating at the district courts, from 1998 through the first six
months of 2005, that contained a dissenting opinion. Each opinion was
scored according to the issue or combination of issues addressed by the
dissenting opinion. The results are shown in Table IX.'57
154. Chu, supra note 5, at 1137-38.
155. Included within this category are any decisions assessing the validity of a patent against the
statutory requirements for patentability, as well as judge-made doctrines such as certain forms of
double patenting.
156. E.g., antitrust, contract, and trademark or copyright infringement claims.
157. Some dissenting opinions disagree with the majority on more than one issue; hence, the
number of dissents on each issue combined exceeds the total number of dissenting opinions
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TABLE IX: DISSENTS BY ISSUE IN PATENT CASES, 1998-2005
DISSENTS DISSENTS DISSENTS
ADDRESSIN DISSENTS IS ADDRESSING ADDRESSING TOTAL
YESI ADDRESSING ADDRESSINGCLAIM INEQUITABLE OTHER DISSENTS
IIINFRINGEMENT INVALIDITYCONSTRUCTION I CONDUCT ISSUES
1998 1 4 2 2 8 12
1999 4 6 1 o 7 14
2000 4 3 2 1 3 I0
2001 7 4 5 I 9 17
2002 6 3o 6 20
2003 9 8 5 2 10 25
2004 16 10 I 8 28
2005 4 0 1 0 6 10
(JAN-JUN)
TOTAL 51 [ 38 3 1 8 57 I 136
To derive issue dissent frequencies from the dissent counts, it is
necessary to estimate the number of cases in the dataset in which the
tabulated issues were presented. Without this denominator, issue dissent
frequencies would be skewed by the frequency with which the issues
appeared in the cases. I determined the number of opinions addressing
claim construction in the district court patent case dataset by a
combination of text-based search and manual review of the entire
dataset.' ss For the remaining categories, I obtained the frequency of
issues in Federal Circuit appeals from the earlier study of Chu' s9 and by
manual review of a sample of the dataset.' l° The frequencies with which
158. I screened the district court dataset with the search "claim! w/5 (construction or construing or
construe! or interpret!)" to obtain an initial dataset of 755 total cases. I then manually reviewed the
resulting opinions to determine whether the opinion (majority, concurring, or dissenting) addressed
any issue requiring the court to determine the scope of a patent's claim. Opinions were classified as
addressing claim construction if the court considered the merits of the claim construction from the
lower court. Included in this category are considerations of whether the district court's claim
construction was sufficiently thorough, questions of compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 if
determination required the court to interpret the claim language, classification and construction of
claims drawn according to 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, and opinions addressing the effect of prosecution
history estoppel if determination required the court to interpret the claim language. Opinions were not
considered to address claim construction if the appellate court merely noted that the issue of claim
construction was moot or waived, or if the court otherwise declined to address the lower court's claim
construction. These criteria are significantly broader than that employed by Wagner and Petherbridge,
who scored an opinion only if the discussion of claim interpretation was sufficiently comprehensive to
be classified according to the methodologies of claim construction proposed in their paper. Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 6, at s 146-47. Wagner and Petherbridge report 413 opinions for the period of
this study, as compared to the 614 recovered by the broader criteria. Id.
159. Chu, supra note 5, at 1162 tbl. G-2.
16o. Data for 1998 and 1999 were taken directly from the set of all Federal Circuit opinions
compiled by Chu. Id. at 1092. For the period 2000 through June 2005, I generated a random sample of
reported and unreported opinions from the dataset and reviewed each case in the sample to determine
which issues it addressed. The sample size was fifty cases for 2000-2004, and forty cases for the first six
months of 2005. Because claim construction was scored both in the review of the entire dataset and in
the review of the samples, we may assess the precision of sampling by comparing the actual number of
claim construction cases and the number estimated from the sampling. For the period 2000-2005, the
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issues were addressed in reported and unreported patent opinions of the
Federal Circuit are shown in Table X.
TABLE X: PATENT ISSUE INCIDENCE FREQUENCIES, 1998-2005
YEAR CLAIM INFRINGEMENT INVALIDITY 1 INEQUITABLE OTHER
CONSTRUCTIONj CONDUCT
1998 52% 50% 31% IO% 58%
1999 49% 54% 36% to% 49%
2000 51% 50% 28% 6% 50%
2001 57% 32% 42% 8% 50%
2002 52% 38% 34% 6% 56%
2003 63% 58% 34% io% 42%
2004 54% 36% 26% 6% 6o%
2005
(JAN-JUN) 34% 23% 33% 10% 65%
1998-20051 51% 46% 33% ] 9 ] 53%
From the incidence of dissent on each issue and the frequency with
which each issue was addressed in Federal Circuit decisions, I
determined the frequency with which each issue provoked dissent in
reported and unreported opinions of the Federal Circuit for each year of
this study. I then compared the dissent frequency associated with each
issue to the dissent frequency associated with claim construction to
obtain I)Ii,,, the relative indeterminacy of each issue as compared to the
indeterminacy of claim construction. Table XI shows the results.
distribution by year of actual and estimated claim constructed cases corresponded closely. A two-
sample chi-squared test did not support the hypothesis that the distributions were different (chi-
squared = 6.o; p = 0.55).
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TABLE XI: PATENT ISSUE DISSENT FREQUENCIES, 1998-2005
YEAR CLAIM INFRINGEMENT INVALIDITY INEQUITABLE OTHER
CONSTRUCTION CONDUCT
i998 1.4% 6.o% 4.8% 15.6% 10.4%
1999 5.6% 7.6% 1.9% o.o% 9.8%
2000 5.5% 4.2% 5.0% 11.7% 4.2%
2001 6.9% 7.1% 6.7% 7.1% 10.2%
2002 7.5% 5.I% 19.0%* io.8% 6.9%
2003 8.7% 8.5% 9.0% 12.3% 14.6%
2004 19.5%* 18.4%* 10.2% II.O% 8.8%
2005 (J-J) 11.8% 0.0% 3.0% 0.0% 9.1%
TOTAL 8.3% 7.5% 7.7% 8.5% 9.2%
If ( I .00) 0.91 0-93 1.02 [ .I
Table XI shows that over the period extending from January of 1998
through June of 2005, claim construction provoked dissent at the Federal
Circuit at a frequency nearly identical to infringement, invalidity,
inequitable conduct, or other issues: the value of I/I,,,r is very near one
for each of the issues examined. The differences observed between total
issue dissent frequencies were not at all statistically significant. 6' In other
words, there is no support for the hypothesis that over the entire period
of this study, claim construction was any more or less indeterminate than
any other issue of patent law. Admittedly, the resolution of this analysis
is not precise: groupings such as "invalidity" or "other" mask many
different sub-issues of undoubtedly varying determinacy. Furthermore,
the frequency of dissent on claim construction should show some degree
of correlation with the frequency of dissent on infringement and
invalidity issues because patent infringement and patent validity both
depend on the scope of the patent's claims. Nonetheless, within the
bounds of these issue definitions, the data presented here provide for the
first time an accurate measure of the indeterminacy of the legal regime
governing patent infringement litigation. These data suggest that
between 1998 and 2005, the general categories of legal issues resolved by
the Federal Circuit in patent litigation have been characterized by
approximately the same degree of legal indeterminacy.
That said, the data may support the hypothesis that dissent
frequencies at the Federal Circuit have changed over time within the
161. A two-sample chi-squared test yielded p = o.87.
162. Not all determinations of infringement or invalidity involve disputes over claim construction.
There may be no disagreement about the scope of the claims, or the resolution of an invalidity issue
may be the same regardless of which party's claim construction argument prevails.
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period of this study. The distribution of dissent frequencies for claim
construction and invalidity over time differs significantly from that
expected by chance, and it differs marginally significantly for
infringement. 6 3 For inequitable conduct and other issues, the hypothesis
that the distribution over time differed from that expected by chance was
not supported. To explore the possibility that the significant fluctuations
in dissent frequencies over time reflected a real change in the probability
of dissent, I constructed for each issue independent' logistic regression
models of dissent as a function of a single nominal variable, representing
a parameter specific to each year. The models showed statistically
significant, positive effects on the odds of dissent relative to the mean for
2002 with respect to invalidity I65 and for 2004 with respect to claimi 66 • 67
construction and infringement. For claim construction but not other
issues, the data also fit a model in which the odds of dissent increased
modestly, but significantly, for each year from 1998 to 2005; '" these
results are consistent with outcome-based studies suggesting increasing
disparity in the Federal Circuit's claim construction methodology over
time.' 6 Because time-dependent increases in dissent probability appear
for some issues but not others, the data may suggest that the increases in
dissent observed for 2002 and 2004 are accounted for by an increase in
issue-specific legal indeterminacy around those years, rather than an
increase in the circuit-wide structural parameter S.170
There seems no clear factor to account for the increased incidence of
dissents on invalidity issues during 2002, other than the observation that
the Federal Circuit decided several significant and controversial cases on
validity issues in 2002: the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, the invalidity of patents anticipated by an inherent disclosure in
163. Chi-squared values by Pearson's moment test were claim construction: 18.9, p = o.oo8;
infringement: 13.2, p = o.o7; invalidity: 14.1, p = 0.05; inequitable conduct: 3.6, p = 0.82; other issues:
5.4, p = O.6i.
164. We cannot assume that dissent on each issue is independent within each case, so it is not
permissible to construct a single model. Obviously, dissent on claim construction will be correlated
with dissent on infringement and invalidity because whether or not claims are valid and infringed
depends on their scope.
165. Whole-model chi-squared 13.I, p = 0.07; Year(2004) chi-squared 9.6, p = 0.002.
166. Whole-model chi-squared 18.5,p =o.oi; Year(2004) chi-squared ii.8,p =o.oo06.
167. Whole-model chi-squared 12.7, p = 0.08; Year(2004) chi-squared 1i.8, p = o.ooo. The whole-
model chi-squared implies that the entire model is significant only at the 92% level, not the 95% level.
68. Treating the year of decision as a continuous variable yielded a model with a value of 0.27 for
the year parameter, corresponding to an increase in the odds ratio (not probability) of dissent of 1.3:1
each year. For this model, the whole-model and year parameter chi-squared fit was 13.1, p = 0.0oo03.
Obviously, such a model cannot be extended indefinitely in time, as it predicts that the probability of
dissent would eventually approach ioo%.
169. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 6, at 1149-50 (finding that the proportion of "strong"
methodologies increased in claim construction opinions from 1996 to 2002).
170. But see discussion infra Part VI on the effect of normalizing the claim construction dissent
frequency to the Federal Circuit's non-interpretation dissent frequency.
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the prior art, and prosecution laches (the effect of an applicant's
untoward delay in pursuing her application before the Patent and
Trademark Office).' 7' The increase in dissents on claim construction
issues in 2004 certainly may explain why the Federal Circuit granted en
banc review in Phillips in mid-2004; the significant increase in dissent
frequency would convey the impression that claim construction was
becoming more contentious. But, there is no obvious explanation why
claim construction provoked more disagreement at the Federal Circuit in
2004. Examination of claim construction dissents from 1998 to 2005
revealed no patterns other than small increases in the proportion of
dissents on the proper role of dictionaries and other extrinsic evidence.
The increase may be attributable in part to disagreements over
dictionaries in the wake of Texas Digital and its progeny, a line of cases
heavily emphasizing technical dictionaries as a source of meaning in
claim construction.'72 Certainly the Federal Circuit felt so: the court took
special care to disapprove of Texas Digital and its progeny in its en banc
opinion in Phillips.173 We might further speculate that the apparent drop
in dissent frequency in the first half of 2005 reflected consensus among
Federal Circuit judges that disputes over claim construction should be
put on hold until the court issued its opinion in Phillips. However, the
relatively small number of claim construction dissents renders all such
explanations little more than speculation. With so few dissents, it is
difficult to establish whether there was any meaningful increase or trend
in disagreements over specific claim construction issues over the period
of this study, or whether the increase in disagreements that apparently
sparked en banc review in Phillips represented the culmination of a long-
term trend or merely an effect peculiar to 2004.
VI. COMPARING INTERPRETIVE REGIMES
A. MEASURING CONTRACT INTERPRETATION INDETERMINACY
There is little or no evidence that claim construction is less
determinate than other aspects of patent law. Nonetheless, we might ask
171. See Elan Pharm. v. Mayo Found., 3o4 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2oo2); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe, Inc., 285 F.3 d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ., & Research
Found., 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Otherwise, the invalidity dissents of 2002 are notable only for
the frequency with which (then-Chief) Judge Mayer dissented from rulings overturning jury verdicts
holding patents invalid. Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting);
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 746 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Mayer, C.J., dissenting);
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 3o8 F.3d 1167, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Mayer, C.J., dissenting). Lest the reader develop the impression that Judge Mayer was hostile to
patents during 2002, Judge Mayer's other dissent on invalidity during 2002 would have sustained the
district court's pre-verdict grant of JMOL in favor of the patentee. See S. Clay Prods. v. United
Catalysts, Inc., 43 F. App'x 379, 386 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
172. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 3o8 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
173. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 45 F.3d 1303, 1319-24 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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how claim construction compares against other interpretive regimes.
Some of the indeterminacy in claim construction cases may stem from
the particular framework of interpretation erected by the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit. But part of the observed indeterminacy may also
arise from the difficulties inherent in linguistic interpretation. To fairly
assess how well the claim construction regime operates at the appellate
level, the relevant question might be not how claim construction
compares to other aspects of patent law, but how claim construction
compares to other interpretive regimes that must also grapple with the
ambiguities of language. "4
To assess the relative indeterminacy of interpretive regimes, I
compared the interpretation of patent claims at the Federal Circuit with
the interpretation of contracts at the regional United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The Circuit Courts of Appeals, obviously, are nearest
to the Federal Circuit in the character of the judges, procedure, number
of cases resolved, and other parameters that might influence the
incidence of dissent. The choice of contract interpretation as the regime
to compare claim interpretation against rests on both theoretical and
practical grounds. Theoretical because while the effect of a patent-to
establish rights good against the world-may be more akin to a statute
than a contract, "5 in their diversity of subject matter and authorship,
patents resemble contracts more than they do legislation. I76 Practical
because it is feasible to design relatively simple text-based strategies to
recover the entire set of contract interpretation cases decided by the
Circuit Courts of Appeals; statutory interpretation arises in so many
different contexts that the definition and isolation of all statutory
interpretation cases may be impossible by textual screening.'77
I began the assessment of indeterminacy in contract interpretation
by measuring the frequency of dissents in reported and unreported
opinions addressing the interpretation of contracts at each of the federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals for the years 1998 to 2003. The dataset for this
174. Of course, nearly every conceivable legal determination requires interpretation of some text.
175. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3 d i448, 1466 (Fed. Cir. I998); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 987 (Fed. Cir. i995).
176. Patent claims emerge, like contracts, from a process of negotiation between two parties: the
patent applicant and an examiner at the Patent and Trademark Office. Patent claims may attempt to
capture in language any tangible or intangible process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. This diversity is comparable to contract language, which may attempt to capture all human
economic behavior or any other relationship between persons and entities. The subject matter of
statute is somewhat smaller, defining the rights and duties of citizens and the operation of government.
For comparison, there have been more than seven million patents, usually with multiple claims, issued
in the United States over the last two hundred years-a figure no doubt dwarfed by the number of
contracts drafted in the same period, but exceeding the number of statutes.
177. Where agency action is involved, statutory interpretation is further complicated by the
question of deference to agency interpretations.
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study was defined by first employing a text-based search algorithm,' Ts and
subsequent manual screening to identify opinions in which the Courts of
Appeals considered the interpretation of a contract between private
parties.'79  Given the more varied contexts in which contract
interpretation issues may arise, classifying a case as one involving
contract interpretation vel non necessarily involves more subjectivity
than classifying a case as one involving claim construction.'
Table XII reports the number of cases recovered by the textual
screen, the number of cases determined to address contract
interpretation issues, and the incidence of dissent on contract
interpretation issues. Table XII also shows the frequency of dissent on
issues other than contract interpretation in contract interpretation cases.
178. The LEXIS Courts of Appeals databases were screened with the query "contract /s interpret!
or constru! or ambigu! or defin! or mean! & not plea agreement or maritime or consent decree or
name(United States)." The optimal search algorithm was developed by first obtaining a relatively
complete population of cases addressing contract interpretation for defined time periods from two
different courts, and then testing search algorithms against the set of all contract interpretation cases
to ascertain which search algorithm best identified all the interpretation cases with the fewest number
of "false positive" results. To obtain a relatively complete population of cases addressing contract
interpretation , I recovered every opinion containing the word "contract" in three-month periods from
the Second Circuit (July 1, 1999 to September 30, 1999, 92 cases) and the Ninth Circuit (January i,
2003 to March 1, 2003, io8 cases) and manually screened these cases to establish which ones addressed
contract interpretation. Several dozen different text-based search algorithms were then tested against
the relatively complete population to identify which algorithm performed best, as measured by
identifying all of the known interpretation cases and the fewest non-interpretation cases.
179. Cases in which federal, state, or foreign governments or government agencies were named
parties were excluded, in part because contracts with government agencies may be subject to defined
regimes of interpretation. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2005) (defining numerous terms for use in
government contracting). To keep the dataset focused primarily on opinions in which the Court of
Appeals determined the meaning of contract language according to ordinary principles of
interpretation, maritime contracts, opinions interpreting plea agreements or agreed-to injunctions, and
opinions involving the review of an arbitrator's interpretation of a contract were also excluded.
18o. Opinions were classified according to the principle that interpretation cases were ones in
which the court sought to derive intention or meaning from the language of the parties. Thus, for
example, the familiar classroom case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus, though a case deciding contract
formation, would have been classified as an interpretation case in this study because it was necessary
for the court to determine the meaning each party subjectively attached to the term "Peerless." 159
Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
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TABLE XII: CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AND DISSENTS AT THE CIRCUIT
COURTS OF APPEALS, 1998-2003
CASES CONTRACT CONTRACT O H CONTRACT TH DISSN
CIRCUIT SCRE INTERPRETATION INTERPRETATION OT I INTERPRETATION OREDSENT
SCREENED CASES DISSENTS DISSENTS DISSENT FREQUENCY ENCY
I 245 8o 0 2 0.00% 2.50%
2 382 142 6 2 4.23% 1.41%
3 250 98 6 2 6.12% 2.04%
4 318 133 16 7 12.03% 5.26%
5 325 120 5 4 4.17% 3.33%
6 474 172 II 4 6.40% 2.33%
7 494 170 7 0 4.12% 0.00%
8 346 147 7 1 4.76% o.68%
9 733 249 22 8 8.84% 3.21%
10 383 130 5 2 3.85% 1.54%
II 222 79 3 1 3.80% 1.27%
D.C. 245 14 o o 0.00% 0.00%
FEDERAL 204 27 3 I 11.11% 3.70%
TOTAL 4621 1561 91 34 1 5.83% 2.18%
TOTAL
EXCLUSIVE OF
FEDERAL 4417 1534 88 33 5.74% 2.15%
CIRCUIT
Contract interpretation questions provoked dissent in panel opinions
with an incidence from a low no dissent rate at the First and D.C.
Circuits, to a high of 12.03% at the Fourth Circuit. The average incidence
of dissent from all reported and unreported contract interpretation cases
from 1998 to 2003 was 5.83%.I 8I Other issues arising in contract
interpretation cases provoked dissent at lower frequencies, ranging from
0% to 5.26% with an average incidence of 2. 18%.
Table XII shows that dissent frequencies on matters of contract
interpretation varied considerably between the various Circuit Courts of
Appeals: aside from the lack of dissents in the First and D.C. Circuits,
18i. Restricting the analysis to reported cases only depressed the overall dissent rate to 5.75%.
This effect is due almost entirely to the Ninth Circuit, which selected for publication only ten of its
twenty-two opinions containing dissents on contract interpretation issues.
182. The higher incidence of dissent on interpretation questions, as compared to non-
interpretation issues in interpretation cases, does not support any meaningful conclusions about the
relative determinacy of contract interpretation. Aside from the low number of dissents on non-
interpretation questions, the incidence of other issues in contract interpretation is obviously highly
biased towards issues that are contested when parties litigate contract disputes. Thus, if anything, the
discrepancy suggests only that other legal issues arising from the same set of facts as contract disputes
tend to be more constrained than interpretation issues in those disputes.
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there is an approximately three-fold variation in interpretation dissent
rates between the low circuits (the Tenth and Eleventh) and the high
(the Fourth). Similar patterns, though not as pronounced, may be seen in
the frequency of dissent on non-interpretation issues to the extent the
small number of such dissents permits analysis.
The variation between dissent rates seen in Table XII must reflect
some combination of differences in the determinacy of the cases
presented to the court, differences in the court's structural variables that
generate or suppress dissent in all cases, and purely stochastic
variation. 183 It is difficult to imagine sources of systematic variation in the
determinacy of contract interpretation cases presented to the various
circuits, unless regional concentration of industries or variations in state
law leads to regional over- or under-representation of contracts posing
difficult interpretation questions. 84 It seems more likely that variation in
structural variables between the circuits contributes the greater portion
of variation between circuit dissent rates. 5'
Recall from Part III that the probability of dissent on a particular
issue, at a particular court C, and in a case that addresses legal issue x,
may be represented by the relation P. = Ix S. Ix represents the
indeterminacy of the legal issue of interest, and S, represents the "extra-
legal" structural variables that affect the incidence of dissent at court C.
Let us divide the legal issues considered by the court into two categories:
interpretation issues and all other issues. The contributions of each
decision-making process to dissent are given by the relations:
Pnterpretation = interpretation X S C
Pother = Iother X S C
where lothr represents the average indeterminacy of all non-interpretation
183. See Songer, supra note 73, at 135.
184. For example, if oil and gas contracts tended to pose particularly difficult questions of
interpretation, one might expect more dissent on contract interpretation issues in the Fifth Circuit. Or
perhaps the degree to which the law of contract interpretation is determinant varies between states,
and therefore provokes more or less dissent at the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals when diversity
cases are resolved according to the law of those states.
185. See Songer, supra note 73, at 135. The variables most clearly tied to variations in dissent rates
in Songer's study of variation between dissent rates at the regional circuits were ideological diversity
of the judges, urbanization of the states comprising each circuit, and reversal of the lower court's
decision. Id. at 128-29. Songer, noting that dissenting judges tended to support the decision below,
provides a psychological explanation for this effect: the judge who must suffer the "loneliness of
dissent" by disagreeing with his colleagues may take comfort in agreement with the judge below who is
being reversed. Id. Less psychologically minded observers might argue that indeterminate questions of
law tend to produce both inter-court and intra-court dissent.
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issues resolved by the court. 86
If the variation in the overall dissent rates between the Circuit
Courts of Appeals arises primarily from variation in the structural
variables between the courts, not variation in the determinacy of cases
which each circuit hears, then the structural constant Sc is the same for
interpretation and non-interpretation issues. Under these conditions,
normalization of the interpretation dissent frequency to the overall
dissent frequency at each court should yield the measure of the relative
determinacy of interpretation issues:
Pinterp Iinterp X SC Iinterp
Pother Iother X Sc Iother
To separate the variation arising from structural differences between
the various Circuits, I measured the incidence of dissent in all reported' 87
opinions of the Circuit Courts of Appeals over the time period for which
we measured contract interpretation rates of dissent.'" I then subtracted
the number of reported contract interpretation dissents' 89 from these
measurements to yield the incidence of dissent on all issues other than
contract interpretation. Table XIII shows the frequency of contract
interpretation dissent (Pi,,,ep), the frequency of dissent on all other issues
(Po,e), and the ratio of contract interpretation dissent frequency to other
issue dissent frequency (Pj,,,,.Pohr) for the period 1998-2003.
186. If dissents on interpretation and "other" issues arise independently, then the probability of
any dissent in a case presenting both interpretation and "other" issues is given by the relation P,,, =
P_,,_rr + P.,_ - (P- ,, x Po,)" With a large enough dataset, this relationship permits the
probability of dissent on one issue to be calculated if the frequency of dissent on the second issue and
the total frequency of dissent is known. Here Pi,,, and P,,,, are measured directly so this
calculation is unnecessary.
187. Discrepancies between how the various Circuit Courts (and the corresponding databases)
treat unreported dispositions-such as non-precedential opinions and summary affirmances-make
accurate comparison and aggregation of dissent frequencies extremely difficult without manually
tabulating each case. Exclusive reliance on reported opinions increases the apparent magnitude of
dissent, because summary affirmances (which are almost always unanimous) and 'trivial' opinions are
excluded from the dataset. I use this statistic only as a common denominator to compare the frequency
of claim construction and contract interpretation dissents. It cannot be itself compared to other dissent
frequencies reported here or from other sources. In general, much of the literature on dissent
frequency is incommensurable because the parameters governing inclusion or exclusion of opinions
from the datasets differ or are left undefined.
188. This analysis employed the Westlaw databases containing the reported decisions of the
individual U.S. Courts of Appeals (CTAiR, CTA2R, etc.). For each year the total number of opinions
containing a dissent was estimated by searching each database with the field search "diss(judge),"
while the total number of opinions was estimated by searching for the term "court."
189. There were no interpretation cases with a dissent both on an interpretation issue and on
another issue for the period in question.
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TABLE XIII: REPORTED DISSENTS AT THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS,
1998-2003
REPORTED REPORTED NON.
CONTRACT CONTRACT TOTAL INTERPRE- TOTAL
CIRCUIT INTERPRE- INTERPRE- P"" REPORTED TAnD REPORTED REPOPRT
TATION TATION DISSENTS REPORTED CASES REPORTED
DISSENTS CASES DISSENTS
I 0 78 0.00% 79 79 2059 3.84% O.OO
2 6 102 5.88% 189 183 3058 5.98% 0.9
3 6 63 9.52% 218 212 1714 12.37% 0.77
4 12 97 12.37% 263 251 1492 16.82% 0.7
5 5 105 4.76% 276 271 3296 8.22% o.58
6 8 67 11.94% 437 429 2619 16.38% 0.73
7 7 145 4.83% 227 220 4030 5.46% o.88
8 6 i4I 4.26% 398 392 4308 9.10% 0.47
9 10 89 11.24% 837 827 5235 15.8o% 0.71
10 2 59 3.39% 185 183 2128 8.6o% 0.39
II 3 79 3.80% 165 162 2563 6.32% 0.60
D.C. 0 13 0.00% II6 II6 1545 7.51% 0.00
FEDERAL 2 16 12.50% 223 221 1554 14.22% o .88
TOTAL 67 1054 6.36% 3 [ 613 346 34547 10.26% o.62
TOTAL
w/o 65 1038 6.26% 339 3325 34047 9.77% o.64
CAFC
These measurements show a very strong correlation"9 between the
frequency of dissent on contract interpretation issues and the frequency
of dissent on non-interpretation issues over the period 1998 to 2003. For
example, the absence of interpretation dissent in the First Circuit mirrors
its overall low rate of dissent on other issues,'' while the relatively high
rates of contract interpretation dissent observed in the Fourth and
Federal Circuits seem less remarkable in light of the generally high level
of dissent at those courts. It seems unlikely that the indeterminacy of
contract interpretation issues and the indeterminacy of non-
interpretation issues co-varies systematically between the Circuit Courts
of Appeals.9 Unless there is a correlation between the indeterminacy of
interpretation and non-interpretation cases at each circuit, the
correlation between contract interpretation dissent frequencies and non-
interpretation dissent frequencies suggests that the variation between
contract interpretation dissent rates reflects structural differences
between the circuits rather than variation in the determinacy of the cases
19o. r = o.9o,p < o.oi at the least.
191. Not so for the D.C. Circuit, but the low number of contract interpretation cases decided by
the D.C. circuit may make the absence of interpretation dissent misleading. Adding a single additional
contract interpretation case with a dissent to the D.C. Circuit would raise its interpretation dissent
index to the highest of all the Circuits.
192. Because the bulk of contract interpretation issues at the Circuit Courts of Appeals arise in
diversity cases, we would have to postulate that regional differences in the state law of contract
interpretation correlate with regional variations in the determinacy of federal law.
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presented to them.'93 If so, this data validates the hypothesis that the
probability of dissent may be modeled by the relation P. = I. x Sc, the
product of legal indeterminacy and a structural constant characteristic of
each court.94
If the variation in general dissent rates largely reflect structural
differences between the various Circuit Courts of Appeals, we may
normalize the contract interpretation dissent rates to the general dissent
rates, thereby separating the contributions of structural variables and of
contract interpretation indeterminacy out from the contract
interpretation dissent rates. To normalize the observed contract
interpretation dissent frequencies to the general level of dissent observed
at the Circuit Courts of Appeals, I divided the frequency of dissent in
contract interpretation cases by the frequency of dissent on all other
issues. If the structural variables remain constant between interpretation
and non-interpretation cases, then the incidence ratio P,,,ejPo,,er will
equal the indeterminacy ratio Ii,,erIh r. This dimensionless number
estimates the relative indeterminacy of contract interpretation issues as
compared to the aggregate indeterminacy of all other issues resolved by
the Circuit Courts of Appeals."
The overall relative indeterminacy measure, comparing all contract
interpretation dissents to all dissents from all the Circuits, is o.62.'
96
Roughly speaking, a judge is 62% as likely to dissent on the issue of
contract interpretation in a case presenting a contract interpretation issue
as the judge is to dissent on any issue in any case. The utility of this
statistic, standing alone, is limited. The universe of possible judicial
decisions encompassed by "any issue" is so diverse that it would mean
little to say that contract interpretation law is only 62% as indeterminate
as all other law. More seriously, we do not know how many opportunities
each case presents for dissent. The more issues present in any given case,
the more likely dissent will arise.'97 The indeterminacy ratio measures
only the relative determinacy of contract interpretation and all other
issues in the aggregate, not between contract interpretation and an
193. This explanation is consistent with findings that the probability of dissent is most strongly
influenced by court-wide norms on the acceptability of dissenting behavior. See HETrINGER ET AL.,
supra note 51, at IIi.
194. Whether the remaining variation between the Circuits represents varying determinacy of the
contract interpretation cases, systematic variation between the contribution of structural variables to
contract interpretation dissent and to all other dissent, or simply random fluctuation, cannot be
determined from the data.
195. In less technical terms, it represents how often judges disagree with each other about contract
interpretation, adjusted for their overall disagreeableness.
196. The overall dissent index is essentially unchanged if the contract interpretation cases are
restricted to reported opinions only.
197. At the extreme, if a case presented an infinite number of issues, we would expect a dissent
frequency approaching loo% assuming each issue contributes a finite probability of dissent.
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"average" issue. It is therefore not possible to draw significant
conclusions about the determinacy of contract interpretation law from
the dissent ratios alone.'
98
C. COMPARING INTERPRETIVE INDETERMINACY ACROSS MULTIPLE ISSUES
AND COURTS
The useful comparison is not indeterminacy between an interpretive
regime and everything else, but indeterminacy between two different
interpretive regimes-in our case, patent claim interpretation and
contract interpretation. If the same court resolves cases in each
interpretive regime, then the comparison is as straightforward as the
relative issue indeterminacies measured in Part V above. We are not so
fortunate. Patent claim interpretation is performed almost exclusively by
the Federal Circuit,' 9 and, as shown in Table XII, the Federal Circuit
interprets few contracts other than those with the United States as a
party.
If we compare how an issue xi is resolved at court A with how an
issue x2 is resolved at court B, the structural variable Sc no longer drops
out of the comparison:
Pxi,= IxLi x SCa
Px2,b = Ix2 X SCb
Ixl Px, X SCb
Ix2 Px2,b X SCa
Because Sc will vary from court to court, comparison of dissent
frequencies between different courts on a particular issue aggregates the
effects of legal indeterminacy and differences, if present, in structural
variables between the courts. In order to compare the relative
determinacy of legal regimes between different courts, it is necessary to
disentangle the contributions of legal indeterminacy and structural
variables to the probability of dissent. We have no means to
independently measure the value of the structural variables Sca and Scb
If, however, courts A and B both decide a legal issue of similar
198. This significant point seems to have escaped notice in the political science literature.
Theoretically, each case could be tabulated to determine the number of issues which it presented, and
the incidence of dissent normalized to the number opportunities for dissent. The subjectivity involved
in counting the number of issues presented by a case, and massive scale required, seem to render this
approach impractical.
199. A very small number of claim interpretations may be performed by other courts in the
context of a dispute not within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, such as the scope of a patent license
agreement in a contract case or a case in which an issue arising under the patent laws is raised only in
the counterclaim.
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determinacy, x3, then the relative ratio of the structural variables
characteristic of those courts may be determined:
Px3,. = x3 X SCa
Px3,b = Ix3 X Scb
Px3, b Ix3 X SCb Scb
Px3,a Ix3 X SCa SCa
At this point, it becomes possible to compare directly the indeterminacy
of issues xi and x2 between the two courts, employing only the
probabilities of dissent:
Ixl Pl,,0 x Scb Pxl,a X Px3,b
I2 Px2,b X SC. P 2,b X Px3,a
This procedure requires us to measure dissent frequencies at two
different courts when considering issues with similar legal indeterminacy.
What issue, x3, will present similar levels of indeterminacy between our
courts of interest? We could attempt to define x3 as a single, particular
legal issue that is decided by both the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and the other Circuit Courts of Appeals. While such issues do
exist,"° the number of cases in any single issue may well be too small to
yield reliable data.
Instead, I define x3 to be the aggregate statistic of all non-
interpretation cases decided by the Courts of Appeals in reported
opinions over the period 1998 through June 2005, with a unitary
indeterminacy of othe,
. 
Because Iother is a statistic averaging the individual
contributions to indeterminacy made by all legal issues resolved by the
court, it follows that two courts with similar dockets and similar
precedent will, on the whole, be characterized by similar values of other
. 
In
other words, between two tribunals which operate under similar legal
regimes, discrepancies in dissent frequencies should reflect differences in
structural variables between the two courts that lead them to be more or
less dissent-prone.
I assume, therefore, that the weighted aggregate indeterminacy of all
non-interpretation"1 issues, Ioher, is the same in reported opinions of the
Federal Circuit and (collectively) the other Circuit Courts of Appeals.
200. For example, the Federal Circuit follows the law of the originating Circuit when resolving
non-patent issues in patent infringement cases.
201. More precisely, all issues at the Federal Circuit other than claim construction, and all issues at
the regional Circuit Courts of Appeals other than contract interpretation.
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This assumption is not precise. The Federal Circuit is a court of
specialized jurisdiction, and, as shown in Table II, its docket comprises a
particular assortment of cases with distinct levels of legal indeterminacy.
If these cases weighted by their frequency are more (or less)
indeterminate than the diet of the non-specialized regional Circuit
Courts of Appeals, our comparison will be skewed.0 2 There are,
however, centripetal factors that would counteract the pull of specialized
jurisdiction and tend to conform the Federal Circuit's 'ohe, with that of its
sister Circuits. First, although the statutes and precedents determining
the Federal Circuit's cases are different from those binding on the other
Circuit Courts of Appeals, as the number of issues comprising oher
increases, ohe, should approach a common level of indeterminacy
associated with the linguistic and legal precision employed by the authors
of those precedents-Congress, the Supreme Court, and prior judges of
the Courts of Appeals. We therefore would expect variation in issue
indeterminacy to flatten out if the definition of "legal issue" is
sufficiently broad and diverse. Second, although the Federal and regional
Circuits might differ in the proportion of "routine" and "non-routine"
issues presented for their decision, this analysis is confined to reported
cases with opinions. This restriction filters the raw issue input to each
court, according to the perception by its judges that a case is legally
significant enough to deserve publication in the Federal Reporter. While
we cannot be certain that the same degree of legal indeterminacy in a
case motivates each judge, panel, or court to publish an opinion, the
selection of opinions for publication likely exerts a strong normalizing
effect and tends to make each circuit court's corpus of published
opinions represent cases with similar degrees of determinacy."
To compare the relative determinacy of claim construction cases at
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and contract interpretation
cases resolved by the Circuit Courts of Appeals, I first estimated the
relative contribution of structural variables to dissent according to the
equation introduced above:
202. One might attempt to assess relative indeterminacy by comparing the rates at which the
Courts of Appeals reverse decisions of the lower tribunal, on the theory that indeterminate cases are
more likely to be reversed. The difficulty in assessing the meaning of reversal, and the distinct
possibility that a related set of structural variables influences the probability of reversal, counsels
against this approach. Whether on account of these reasons, or others, the correlation between rates of
dissent and reversal for the circuit courts over time, or between the various circuit courts, is poor. See
SONGER ET AL., supra note 51, at to5-o9.
203. An alternative method would be to construct a multinomial regression model along the lines
of Hettinger et al., and attempt to isolate the contribution of particular structural variables at the
courts of interest-assuming that the database contains sufficient data about each individual effect to
control for the effects of docket composition. See HETrNGER ET AL., supra note 51, at 62.
Unfortunately, the appellate database described by Songer et al. omits the Federal Circuit. See SONGER
ET AL., supra note 51.
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PotherCA Iother X SCA SCA
PotherCAFC Iother X SCAFC SCAFC
Here I define the comparison groups CAFC to be the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, and CA to be the aggregate of all the Circuit
Courts of Appeals, excluding the Federal Circuit. To measure Po~heCAFC
for each of the years 1998 to 2005, I determined the total number of
reported cases, and the number of cases containing a dissent on an issue
other than claim construction. I determined the latter number, as shown
in Table XIV below, by subtracting from the Federal Circuit's total
number of dissents in reported cases, the number of dissents that
addressed claim construction and no other issues. Dividing the number
of dissents by the number of cases yielded PoheCAFo the probability of
dissent on any issue other than claim construction in any reported
Federal Circuit case.
TABLE XIV: REPORTED NON-INTERPRETATION DISSENTS AT THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 1998-2005
TOTAL CLAIM NET FEDERAL TOTAL
FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION CIRCUIT FEDERAL Po.-E, FEDERAL
YEARONLY DISSENTS OTHER CIRCUIT CASES CIRCUIT
DISSENTS ONLYD DISSENTS (
(REPORTED) (REPORTED) (REPORTED)
1998 29 4 25 224 11.16%
1999 29 5 24 221 io.86%
2000 29 3 26 246 10.57%
2001 31 2 29 304 9.54%
2002 52 I 51 273 18.68%
2003 53 6 47 286 16.43%
2004 45 8 37 266 13.91%
2005 JAN-JUN 14 0 14 119 11.76%
TOTAL 282 [ 29 253 ] 1939 [ 1305%/7
The choice of time frame and court for PoherCA, is somewhat arbitrary,
but the choice will also dictate the selection of contract interpretation
cases used for comparison. There is no reason to expect Iothe, or SCA to
vary systematically at the regional circuits over time, and there is little
interest in such variations if they exist. Therefore, the largest (and
presumably most reliable) dataset, the aggregate of all the other Circuit
Courts of Appeals over the period 1998-2003, was selected as the
comparison group. PotherCA consequently remains constant at 9.77%, the
value of P.oh,,CA computed in Table XIII for reported cases of all the
May 20071
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
circuit courts other than the Federal Circuit over the time period 1998-
2003. This choice requires that Pi.,,,, the incidence of dissent on contract
interpretation issues, be defined over the same time period: the
aggregate incidence of dissent in contract interpretation cases of the
aggregated Circuit Courts of Appeals other than the Federal Circuit
from 1998-2003. I then calculated the ratio of the indeterminacy of patent
claim construction, I to the indeterminacy of contract interpretation,
Ikinterp, according to the relation:
Icinterp Pcinterp, CAFC X SCA
Ikinterp Pkinterp, CA X SCAFC
To explore the possibility that the measured properties of the
Federal Circuit-the indeterminacy of claim construction or the
structural variables characteristic of the Federal Circuit-might change
over time, I calculated the indeterminacy ratio using the values of Pctnerp
and Poter for each year at the Federal Circuit from January 1998 through
June 2005. For each year, I separately calculated the indeterminacy ratio
using either all patent and contract interpretation opinions or reported
opinions alone. The results, using constant values of 9.77% for P other. CA
5.74% for knterp, CA (total)' and 6.26% for Pki,,, CA (repored) 2°4 are shown in Table
XV. Table XV also shows the relative indeterminacy of claim
interpretation and all other legal issues at the Federal Circuit, obtained
by dividing the observed frequency of claim construction dissent by the
observed frequency of dissent in all non-interpretation cases.
TABLE XV: COMPARATIVE INDETERMINACY OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
AND CONTRACT INTERPRETATION, 1998-2005
YEAR ( [OTAL IR.. l-,,"-e- 1ap"__/1&.C.FC
TOTALCAF REPORED L (TOTAL) (EPORTED) (REPORTED)
1998 1.45% 2.56% 11.16% o.88 0.22 0.36 0.23
1999 5.56% 7.89% io.86% 0.90 0.87 1.13 0-73
2000 5.48% 7.32% 10.57% 0.92 o.88 i.o8 o.69
2001 6.93% 7.81% 9.54% 1.02 1.24 1.28 0.82
2002 7.50% 8.16% 18.68% 0.52 o.68 o.68 0.44
2003 8.74% 10.45% 16.43% 059 .9I 0.99 0.64
2004 19.51% 25.00% 13.91% 0.70 _239 2.80 i.8o
2005
JAN- 11.76% 10.71% 11.76% 0.83 1.70 1.42 0.91
JUN
TOTAL [ 8.31% i Io.i6% 13.o5% I o.75 1.08 [ 1.21 0.78
204. These values are derived from Tables XIII and XIV.
io86 [VOL. 58:1I025
THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT
Considering all the Federal Circuit's reported opinions from January
1998 through June 2005, we obtain a value for SA/SCAFC of 0.75, signifying
that circuit-level norms of disagreement and other structural variables
suppress dissent to a greater degree at the regional Circuit Courts of
Appeals than they do at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
The ratio of the indeterminacy of all patent claim construction at the
Federal Circuit from January of 1998 through June of 2005, to the
indeterminacy of all contract interpretation at the regional Circuit Courts
of Appeals, was i.o8. Put simply, over the period from Cybor to Phillips,
the average indeterminacy of patent claim construction was virtually
indistinguishable from the indeterminacy associated with contract
interpretation at the regional Circuit Courts of Appeals." The
indeterminacy ratio of claim construction cases to contract interpretation
cases rises to 1.21 when only reported claim construction and contract
interpretations cases are considered. Claim construction appears more
indeterminate if we confine ourselves to reported cases, but the
indeterminacy of claim construction remains unremarkable against that
associated with contract interpretation.
The complexity of the calculations yielding the interpretation
indeterminacy ratios, and the uncertainty associated with the assumption
that oher is constant between the Federal Circuit and its sister courts,
mean that computing the statistical significance of the indeterminacy
ratios is not a realistic exercise. Likewise, year-to-year fluctuations in
Poher counsel against trying to extract much meaning from changes in the
indeterminacy ratio over time. Even without the benefit of statistics, we
may be relatively certain of two conclusions. First, it is highly unlikely
that the small observed difference between the overall indeterminacy of
patent and contract interpretation is statistically significant. There is no
reason to conclude that claim construction at the Federal Circuit has
been any less determinate than contract interpretation at the regional
Courts of Appeals.
Second, once the Federal Circuit's structural parameter is taken into
account, the picture of a uniform increase in claim construction
indeterminacy suggested by the raw claim construction dissent
frequencies becomes more confused. If we were to rely solely on the
frequency of claim construction dissents (Pint , computed in Part V and
shown again in Table XV, the nearly uniform increase in dissent
205. This ratio is proportionally sensitive to the ratio of the indeterminacy of noninterpretation
(patent) cases at the Federal Circuit to the indeterminacy of noninterpretation (contract) cases at the
regional Circuit Courts, which is assumed to equal i for the reported cases. If the noninterpretation
issues before the Federal Circuit are more indeterminate than those before the regional Circuits, then
the estimate of Sc/Sc is too low, and the calculation of l is proportionally too low.
Conversely, if the noninterpretation issues resolved by the regional Circuits are more indeterminate
than those resolved by the Federal Circuit, the estimates of both ratios are too high.
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frequency would lead us to conclude that the indeterminacy of claim
construction increased consistently during the period from the nearly
uniform increase in dissent frequency. This would lead us to conclude
that the indeterminacy of claim construction increased consistently
during the period from Cybor to Phillips. However, the frequency of
dissent on issues other than claim construction PothrCAFC varied
considerably during that interval, raising the possibility that part of the
observed change in claim construction dissents was driven by changes in
the Federal Circuit's structural parameter. If, according to the
methodology of Part IV, we attempt to eliminate the effect of the
structural parameter by calculating an indeterminacy ratio of claim
construction and non-claim construction cases at the Federal Circuit
(Icilnte,./IoherCAFC), the trend is not so clear."' The relative indeterminacy of
claim construction appeals fluctuates with little apparent pattern over the
period 1998 to 2005 although the marked increase of indeterminacy in
2004 remains prominent.
CONCLUSION
Four principal conclusions may be drawn from this study, relating
not only to the Federal Circuit and patent law, but to the study of legal
indeterminacy as well. We may set out first the conclusion relevant to the
general study of indeterminacy: observation of the United States Courts
of Appeals reveals a strong correlation between overall dissent and
dissent on the issue of contract interpretation. Though not the focus of
this study, this finding may be regarded as a predicate for the other
conclusions here drawn-not for what it tells us about the law of
interpretation-but for what it tells us about the study of legal
indeterminacy. In reported cases at Courts of Appeals, overall dissent
frequencies vary from court to court, and the frequency of dissent in
contract interpretation cases differs from the overall rate of dissents.
Despite such variation, there is a high and statistically significant linear
correlation between each court's overall dissent frequency, and its
frequency of dissent in contract interpretation cases. The finding of a
linear correlation across multiple courts, between overall dissent and
dissent on a particular issue, implies that the probability of dissent at an
appellate court may be modeled mathematically as the product of only
two parameters: one parameter specific to the issue or issues under
consideration in a case and a second parameter specific to each court.
One cannot conclude from this data alone that the issue-specific
parameter represents legal indeterminacy. Nonetheless, in light of
existing empirical and theoretical work connecting legal indeterminacy
206. This approach is not rigorous because some fraction of disagreements over infringement or
invalidity are connected to disagreements about claim interpretation.
[Vol. 5 8:10 25
THE MEASURE OF THE DOUBT
with dissent, the most parsimonious explanation of this data is that the
issue-specific and court-specific parameters represent I., the legal
indeterminacy of issue x, and Sc, the extra-jurisprudential characteristics
of the court that provoke or suppress the expression of dissent. The
probability of dissent on issue x may therefore be expressed by the
product of these two parameters, according to the relation Px = Ix x S. It
follows that if the value of Sc can be measured or held constant, the
indeterminacy of any legal issue (or body of law) may be determined
from the observed frequency of dissents on that legal issue in cases where
that legal issue was considered by an appellate court.
Second, examination of the frequency of dissent in cases originating
at the various tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit and the changes
in dissent frequency over time shows significant variation in dissent
frequencies between tribunals and over time. From the results of the
logistic regression model, this study finds that patent infringement cases
arising from the district courts are significantly more indeterminate than
most other categories of cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit. While
this finding may be of interest in and of itself, further study would be
required to draw more specific conclusions. We might wonder, for
example, whether this indeterminacy is peculiar to patent law or
represents indeterminacy inherent in civil litigation at the district courts.
This study finds that patent litigation before the district courts is
significantly more indeterminate than litigation before certain Article I
courts and administrative agencies, but it cannot determine whether
differences in substantive law or differences in procedure are responsible
for these variations in indeterminacy. It would be necessary to compare
patent infringement to another field of civil litigation at the district courts
to draw such conclusions. Likewise, the tribunal data cannot identify the
source of the indeterminacy characteristic of patent cases. Faults in the
patent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit might
be responsible for indeterminacy in patent law, but so might the patent
statutes or the nature of patent cases themselves."
Regardless of tribunal, this study also shows significant variations
over time in the Federal Circuit's dissent frequency. The time-specific
parameter incorporated into the logistic regression model demonstrated
that the Federal Circuit's first full year of operation, 1983, also saw the
strongest incidence of dissent over the court's entire history. For most of
the next decade, until 1995, dissent frequencies tended to be depressed
although this trend was not statistically significant in all years. Following
207. Theoretically, we could pinpoint the origin of indeterminacy by classifying cases and dissents
according to whether the contested issues were those of fact, statute, or precedent, and calculate the
indeterminacy associated with each aspect of patent litigation. One suspects that in most cases these
aspects will be so intertwined that objective classification would be impossible.
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a spike in dissent in 1995, dissent frequencies exhibited no significant
trend until 2002. In that year dissent frequencies were strongly and
significantly elevated above their historical averages, a trend which has
continued-though not necessarily increased-to the present day.
The high frequency of dissent in 1983, followed by a decade of
relative quiet, fits well to a model in which the evolution of precedent
decreases legal indeterminacy over time. At the Federal Circuit's
founding, the slate of precedent was relatively blank. While the Federal
Circuit in its first decision adopted the precedent of its predecessor
courts, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of
Claims,' many of the cases arising under the new court's expanded
jurisdiction had no antecedents at the predecessor courts. In its early
days, the Federal Circuit was therefore relatively unconstrained by
existing precedent, and it follows that more of its cases were
underdetermined. The model described in this study-that legal
indeterminacy produces dissent-predicts that the court's early cases
would generate more dissent because judges unconstrained by precedent
may exercise discretion to fashion new rules of law; in later years, as the
body of case law solidified, fewer cases would present indeterminate
questions of law. That such a pattern is observed in the early years of the
court is consistent with the thesis that legal indeterminacy contributes to
dissent.
However, the observed pattern of high dissent frequencies at the
court's founding, followed by a period of decreased dissent, would also
be consistent with a model depending solely on the court's structural
parameter. The Federal Circuit's first judges were those of its two
predecessor courts, and it is not improbable that 'cultural' tendencies
suppressing dissent evolved as the two groups of judges became more
familiar with each other and with the operation of the new court.
Likewise, the era of elevated dissent-independent of tribunal-
beginning in 2002 could mark either an increase in the indeterminacy of
legal questions considered by the circuit or a breakdown in the structural
constraints that tended to suppress dissent in the decade preceding.
While the current data and analysis do not discriminate between these
possibilities, a change in court culture may seem more plausible than a
coordinated increase in legal indeterminacy across the various bodies of
law overseen by the court. Further study-perhaps investigating the
influence of changes in court personnel-would be necessary before
crediting legal or structural factors for the current era of dissent.
The third major finding of this study is that, considering patent
infringement appeals over the entire period from Cybor to Phillips, there
208. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (adopting, en banc,
precedents of the Court of Claims and CCPA).
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was no statistically significant difference between the indeterminacy
associated with claim construction and the indeterminacy associated with
other aspects of patent infringement litigation. On the other hand, this
study also finds modest but suggestive evidence that the indeterminacy of
claim construction cases tended to increase over this period of time, and
were significantly elevated in 2004. However, dissent frequencies in
many non-patent cases decided by the Federal Circuit began to rise
around the year 2002, and we cannot ignore the possibility that changes
in the Federal Circuit's structural parameters contributed to this increase
in dissent; once we attempt to normalize the claim construction dissent
frequency to the overall dissent frequency, the trend becomes obscured.
Perhaps the only certain conclusion is that drawn from the logistic
regression model: 2004 saw a significant increase in dissents on claim
construction, an increase that was mirrored in dissents on infringement
but not on invalidity, inequitable conduct, or other issues.
The critical literature identifying "unpredictability" and "instability"
in the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence dates, for the
most part, from prior to 2004. 09 It is possible that the critical literature
was based largely on anecdotal evidence inconsistent with the actual
practice of claim construction at the Federal Circuit. Likewise, the
Federal Circuit's decision to review its claim construction jurisprudence
en banc in Phillips may have been a reaction to short-term conflicts over
particular topics in the law of claim construction, rather than any
systemic failing of the post-Markman regime. But, it is also possible that
commentators and judges perceived information that is not accessible by
the methodology of disagreement employed here. Outcome-based
studies-which attempt to determine whether the decisions of different
panels of an appellate court are consistent with each other-have found
evidence that disagreement may be manifested as inconsistencies
between the decisions of unanimous panels, rather than in the form of
dissenting opinions." ' Further, statistical analysis of judicial opinions
measures only the incidence of disagreement, not the intensity of
disagreement. It is possible that observers were responding to an
increase in the intensity of disagreement within the Federal Circuit's
claim construction opinions; perhaps increases in the type or intensity of
disagreement presaged increases in the frequency of disagreement,
although it is difficult to see why such an effect should be particular to
claim construction and not other aspects of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction.
209. See supra notes 4-5.
210. See supra note 6. The study of Wagner and Petherbridge may be regarded as an example of
such an outcome-based study, though Wagner and Petherbridge measured the claim construction
methodology employed by the panel rather than the judgment reached by the panel. See Wagner,
supra note 6.
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Related to the finding that claim construction on the whole has been
no less determinate than other aspects of patent law, this study also finds
that claim construction has been no less determinate than another
interpretive regime, that of contract interpretation. One might naively
expect that the law of contract interpretation, with its much lengthier
pedigree, would have attained a more determinate regime than claim
interpretation-especially in light of the problems posed by the
application of language to new and complex technologies."' It may be
that both regimes have reached an optimum, both equally limited by the
inherent indeterminacy of language. Then too, the difficulties in
interpreting patent claims, relative to contracts, might not be as severe as
might be supposed. Patent claims are drafted self-consciously. Even if the
patent is never asserted, the drafter is aware that the claims' sole purpose
is to delineate the scope of the inventor's legal rights. Claims are also
usually drafted according to highly formal and stylized conventions
rooted in Patent Office requirements and long-standing tradition."' The
final language of the claims emerges from negotiation between the
applicant and a patent examiner, both (hopefully) steeped in the
conventions of claim drafting. Contract language may also be drafted
self-consciously to define legal rights, but it may also be intended solely
for the benefit of the parties-a memorial of their transaction, rather
than a communication to a future judge or jury. Likewise, while contract
language may emerge from a formal and thorough negotiation between
legally skilled parties, it may also be the product of laymen scribbling
hurriedly on a napkin, or it may rest entirely in parol. Perhaps the
surprising result is that contract interpretation approaches the
determinacy of claim construction, rather than the other way around.
The last major conclusion, and perhaps the most prescriptive,
derives from the comparison between how frequently tribunals are
reversed by the Federal Circuit and how frequently cases from those
tribunals generate disagreement within the Federal Circuit. Part IV
showed that, for each tribunal, the frequency of reversal was correlated
with the frequency of dissent, although this study did not examine the
correlation between reversal and dissent at the level of the individual
case.213 The most parsimonious explanation for this finding is that both
reversal and dissent rates are driven by legal indeterminacy; if the legal
211. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002).
212. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (2005) (specifying tripartite structure for claim); U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 6o8.oi(m) (8th ed. 2001) ("While
there is no set statutory form for claims, the present Office practice is to insist that each claim must be
the object of a sentence starting with 'I (or we) claim,' 'The invention claimed is' (or the
equivalent).").
213. Other studies of appellate courts have shown this correlation at the individual case level. See
supra note 185.
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regime does not dictate a particular result on a given set of facts, then
either variation in judicial characteristics between tribunals, or variation
in judicial characteristics within a tribunal, would generate disagreement.
Where variation is distributed similarly at the originating and appellate
tribunals, the ratio of reversals to dissents for a given tribunal will hew
closely to the overall ratio of reversal to dissent characteristic of the
appellate tribunal."4 If we observe a deviation from the general
correlation between reversal and dissent, that is, if a particular tribunal is
reversed at a higher frequency than we would expect from the appellate
dissent rates, then we have identified a systematic difference in judicial
properties between the originating and appellate bodies. These
differences would manifest if the originating and appellate decision-
makers favored different policy goals, or if the originating and appellate
decision makers differed in their competence to discern the 'correct'
outcome of cases.
Such deviations are not observed in patent litigation. Although
district courts deciding patent cases are reversed more frequently than
are most other tribunals reviewed by the Federal Circuit, the same cases
generate more disagreement within the Federal Circuit. The implication
of these data is that the relatively high reversal rates experienced by
district courts result from the indeterminate state of the patent law,
neither from any lack of competence on the part of the district courts,
nor systematic bias215 on the part of the Federal Circuit on issues of
patentability or infringement. Indeed, as shown in Table VII, once
reversal rates are normalized to legal indeterminacy (as measured by
appellate dissent), the district courts are reversed significantly less
frequently than specialized tribunals such as the Boards of Contract
Appeals, the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, or the Merit Systems Protection Board.26
214. If, for example, personal idiosyncrasies alone cause decision-makers to reach different
outcomes in indeterminate cases, those idiosyncrasies would generate disagreement between the
originating and appellate bodies to the same extent they would generate disagreement among judges
of the appellate body, once we adjust for the number of judges involved. The overall ratio of reversal
to dissent is characteristic of each appellate body, because it depends on the value of the structural
parameter associated with appellate reversal and the value of the structural parameter associated with
appellate dissent.
215. Bias relative to the district courts, not in any pejorative sense.
216. Apart from legal indeterminacy and differences between judicial characteristics, reversal rates
are of course affected by the standard of appellate review. The district courts' low reversal rates could
simply reflect a more deferential standard of review, relative to that exercised over other tribunals.
Quantitatively comparing the standards of review exercised over the various tribunals within the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction would be a challenging task. But, it is safe to say that few
commentators accuse the Federal Circuit of being overly deferential to the determinations of the
district courts. See, e.g., John D. Collier, How to Win in the Federal Circuit's Patent Trial Division,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2002, at 22-23 ("Scrutiny of the Federal Circuit's opinions in patent cases
reveals that the court has its own patent trial division, and its name is Judge Lourie.").
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The perception that district courts are reversed on appeal at
unusually high frequencies when trying patent cases has spurred
proposals for removing patent infringement litigation from the district
courts to specialized patent litigation tribunals;' a less radical version-
preferentially assigning patent infringement actions to particular courts
and judges-has garnered legislative support."' Specialized courts would
undoubtedly improve administration of patent litigation."9 However, the
relatively high correspondence between inter-court and intra-court
disagreement observed in this study, and the observation that the district
courts fare rather well when compared to existing specialized tribunals,
suggest that the indeterminacy of patent law, rather than the application
of patent law by the district courts or the Federal Circuit's review of the
district courts, is responsible for the current circumstances of patent
litigation.2 If we regard the current state of affairs as unsatisfactory,
then doctrinal or procedural reforms, rather than structural changes, may
be the path to pursue.
217. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 895-96 (2002); Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent
Infringement Cases after Festo and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a
Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1413 (2004).
218. See supra note 7.
219. Aside from the improvements that might be expected from increased expertise, centralized
patent tribunals would alleviate problems of variations between the district courts. See Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 77 N.C. L. REV.
889, 932-34 (201) (proposing specialized patent trial courts to eliminate forum shopping).
22o. A significant caveat to this argument is that it assumes the Federal Circuit possesses expertise
in patent law comparable to that which a hypothetical specialized trial court would possess. This study
shows that, in the face of the indeterminacy inherent in patent law, the district courts perform as well
as specialized tribunals, relative to the performance of the Federal Circuit. If the Federal Circuit is not
particularly competent in patent law-or is unusually competent in the other fields of its jurisdiction-
then a specialized patent trial tribunal possessing that competence might perform much better than the
district courts currently do. To assess this possibility we would need to compare the nature of the legal
or technical advantages that might be enjoyed by a hypothetical specialized trial tribunal with those
currently enjoyed by the Federal Circuit.
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